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VISA DENIED: WHY COURTS SHOULD
REVIEW A CONSULAR OFFICER’S DENIAL
OF A U.S.-CITIZEN FAMILY MEMBER’S VISA
GABRIELA BACA ∗

Before entering the United States for permanent or temporary residence,
most noncitizens must complete a series of administrative procedures and
background checks. The final step in the process is an interview with a
consular officer in the noncitizen’s home country. That step, in most cases,
determines whether a spouse can permanently rejoin her U.S.-citizen
husband or wife in the United States or whether another immediate family
member can permanently reside in the same home as her U.S.-citizen family
member. After a consular officer decides to admit or deny entry to a
noncitizen family member, there are limited opportunities for administrative
or judicial review of the consular officer’s decision.
For decades, federal courts have adhered to the doctrine of consular
nonreviewability to limit judicial review of a consular officer’s visa decision.
This doctrine, rooted in the legislative and the executive branches’ plenary
power over immigration matters, first emerged in Kleindienst v. Mandel.
Since then, federal courts have interpreted the doctrine—in some instances
limiting the doctrine’s reach, and in others, allowing for more judicial review.
In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Din v. Kerry, a U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision, which held that a visa denial
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impinges on a U.S. citizen’s constitutionally protected interest in her
marriage to a noncitizen spouse.
Without the opportunity for either an administrative appeal or judicial
review of a visa denial, a single consular officer can force a U.S. citizen, like
Mrs. Din, to live apart from her closest family member or to relinquish a
stable life and employment in the United States to move abroad with her
noncitizen family member. This Comment argues that the visa denial of a
U.S. citizen’s family member implicates that citizen’s fundamental Fifth
Amendment due process rights—therefore allowing judicial review of the
denial—because the Supreme Court has long recognized the liberty interests
involved in marriage and in living with one’s immediate and extended family.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine this scenario: a U.S. citizen accurately and timely files all of the
required paperwork for her foreign spouse to permanently immigrate to the
United States. The U.S. government approves the visa two years later.
Several weeks after the approval, at a U.S. consular office overseas, a
consular officer denies her spouse’s visa. The embassy and the consular
officer refuse to provide a reason for the denial. Without this information,
the U.S. citizen and her spouse will not have an opportunity to contest the
consular officer’s decision, and they also will not have an opportunity to seek
administrative or judicial review. As a result of the consular officer’s visa
decision, the U.S. citizen and her spouse will remain separated without
recourse.
This is Fauzia Din’s story. In 2006, Din, a U.S. citizen, married Kanishka
Berashk, a citizen and resident of Afghanistan.1 Shortly after their marriage,
she submitted an I-130 visa petition to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), the U.S. government agency responsible for visa
adjudications, so that Berashk could permanently immigrate to the United
States.2 A year and a half after filing the visa petition, USCIS informed Din
that the agency approved her visa petition for Berashk. 3 As part of the visa
process, USCIS forwarded the approved visa petition to the National Visa
Center (NVC) for processing and then on to the U.S. Department of State’s

1. Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014).
2. Id.
3. Id. The process of filing the petition with USCIS, receiving notification, and
interviewing at a consular post can be lengthy. Din submitted a visa petition for Berashk in
October 2006. Id. USCIS approved the visa petition on February 12, 2008. Id. The U.S.
Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan scheduled Berashk’s consular interview for September 9,
2008. Id. Nine months after the interview, on June 7, 2009, Berashk received a letter
informing him that his visa had been denied. Id. at 859.
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(State Department or DOS) consular post in Pakistan, where a consular
officer interviewed Berashk to issue his visa. 4
Two years after Din first submitted Berashk’s visa petition to USCIS, the
consular officer asked Berashk during the consular interview about his work
for the Afghan Ministry of Social Welfare during the period in which the
Taliban controlled the country. 5 The consular officer, suggesting that he had
approved the visa, told Berashk that he would receive the visa in two to six
weeks. 6 Nine months later, the Embassy notified Berashk that it denied his
visa based on section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
and that there were no waivers available to overcome his ineligibility for a
visa. 7 Unsure of the specific reasons for the denial, Din and Berashk sought
an explanation from the Embassy. 8 The Embassy responded that the
consular officer denied Berashk’s visa under section 212(a)(3)(B), a
provision of the INA that bars admission into the United States for terroristrelated activities. 9 Neither Din nor Berashk received further explanation for
the denial because INA section 212(b) exempts denials based on INA
section 212(a)(2)–(3) from the requirement that the government explain the
basis for the denials. 10 After further requests to the Embassy and to the
Office of Visa Services at the State Department, Din and Berashk received
the same response: the U.S. government would not provide additional facts

4. Id. at 858; see also The Immigrant Visa Process, U.S. DEP’T ST.,
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/immigrate/immigrant-process.html (last visited Jan.
20, 2015) (diagramming all of the steps a U.S. citizen must complete after he or she submits a
visa petition to USCIS). The case did not specify why Berashk visited the Embassy in
Islamabad, Pakistan instead of the Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan.
5. Din, 718 F.3d at 858.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 859. Known as the grounds for inadmissibility, section 212(a) of the INA is a
broad provision that includes all of the grounds that could bar a foreign citizen from entering
the United States. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 92-414,
§ 212(a), 66 Stat. 163, 182–87 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012)) (listing ten
broad provisions for inadmissibility, each specifying dozens of specific acts that could make a
person inadmissible). Because Berashk’s visa denial did not provide a specific ground, the
consular officer could have denied Berashk’s visa on any one of the grounds listed in the
provision, including for health- or security-related reasons, among others.
8. Din, 718 F.3d at 859.
9. Id. Section 212(a)(3) of the INA is one of ten subcategories under section 212(a) that
lists grounds of inadmissibility. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). Section 212(a)(3) includes “security
and related grounds” with subparagraphs describing activities related to terrorism, foreign
policy, or totalitarian party membership that bar a noncitizen’s admission into the United
States. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(A)–(D).
10. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(3) (stating that visas denied under section 212(a)(2)–(3) of the
INA are not subject to the notice requirements of INA section 212(b)(1), which require a
consular officer to provide the applicant with timely written notice of the consular officer’s
findings and the provision under which denial is based).
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or reasons for the denial. 11 Without the facts underlying the denial, Din and
Berashk could not challenge the decision or present evidence to overcome
Berashk’s ineligibility.
Each year, the State Department, through its overseas consular officers,
denies millions of visas. 12 The visas denied range from nonimmigrant tourist
or business visas to family-reunification immigrant visas, such as Berashk’s
immediate relative visa. 13 After a multi-step process with an array of U.S.
government agencies, U.S. consular officers overseas provide the final stamp
of approval or denial before a foreign national can travel to the United
States.14 For U.S.-citizen petitioners, visa beneficiaries, and immigration
practitioners, Din and Berashk’s scenario is all too common: a U.S. consular
officer denies a visa without any real explanation, and the U.S. citizen loses a
long-awaited opportunity to reunite with a foreign family member. This
scenario becomes more pressing for U.S.-citizen family members who have
waited decades to nurture a family, share intimacy, or establish familial
bonds with a family member from whom they have been separated.
Without any formal recourse, the U.S.-citizen petitioner, the visa
beneficiary, and the immigration lawyer are left wondering why the consular

11. Din, 718 F.3d at 859.
12. In fiscal year 2012, the most recent year for which complete data is available, the
State Department issued a combined total of 9,409,390 immigrant and nonimmigrant visas.
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 2012
available
at
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/law-andtbl.I
(2012),
policy/statistics/annual-reports/report-of-the-visa-office-2012.html [hereinafter BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFFAIRS, 2012 REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE]. Of those immigrant visas issued in
fiscal year 2012, 235,616 were immediate relative visas and 189,128 were family-sponsored
visas. Id.
In contrast, DOS refused a combined total of 2,443,984 immigrant and nonimmigrant
visas. Id. tbl.XX. Applicants may overcome a refusal by (1) providing evidence that an
inadmissibility ground did not apply, (2) successfully applying for a waiver, or (3) receiving
another form of relief. Id. at n.2. Of the 311,835 immigrant visas denied because a consular
officer found that an INA ground of ineligibility applied, 215,321 applicants overcame their
ineligibility. Id. Of the 76 applicants found ineligible for a visa under INA section
212(a)(3)(B) for “terrorist activities,” no applicant overcame his or her ineligibility. Id.
Similarly, of the 223 applicants found ineligible for a visa under section 212(a)(3)(A)(ii), the
provision covering applicants who have engaged in “other unlawful activity,” no applicant
overcame his or her ineligibility. Id. By comparison, all visa applicants who were ineligible
for a visa under section 212(a)(4), the provision barring a noncitizen who may become a
public charge, overcame their ineligibility. Id.
13. See id. at tbl.xx (detailing the specific grounds under which consular officers denied
immigrant and nonimmigrant visas in fiscal year 2012).
14. See The Immigrant Visa Process, supra note 4 (detailing the steps involved in
securing a visa). But see Administrative Processing Information, U.S. DEP’T ST.,
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/general/administrative-processing-information.html
(last visited Jan. 20, 2015) (indicating that some applicants will need to undergo “further
administrative processing,” which can take up to sixty days).
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officer denied the application despite USCIS’s approval of the petition.15
The State Department does not have a formal review or appeals process for
denied visas, and federal courts generally refuse to grant jurisdiction to visa
beneficiaries who seek review of a visa denial. 16 This practice, known as
consular absolutism or consular nonreviewability, is deeply rooted in the
legislative and the executive branches’ plenary power over immigration

15. See, e.g., Sharon R. Muse, The Need for Review of Consular Decisions in Visa
Determinations, 13 ADELPHIA L.J. 111, 118–19 (2000) (describing the informal procedures

available to visa petitioners and beneficiaries, such as an optional advisory opinion on a
consulate’s interpretation of the law); Abraham D. Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal
Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1363 (1972)
(criticizing the authority the law grants consular officers to make final, generally unreviewable
immigration decisions because it allows them to “arbitrarily and whimsically issue or deny
visas”).
16. See James A.R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 16–25 (1991) (providing an overview of consular officials’ “[i]nformal and nonreviewed decisionmaking”); Leon Wildes, Review of Visa Denials: The American Consul as
20th Century Absolute Monarch, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 887, 888 (1989) (criticizing a
consular officer’s “unbridled power” to issue visas); infra Part I.A (noting that U.S. citizens
and applicants who do not receive notice of the reason their visas have been denied generally
have no recourse).
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matters.17 Therefore, once a consular officer makes a visa decision, it is
unlikely that a court or a reviewing officer will reverse the decision. 18
Yet, in some instances, courts can engage in a limited review of a visa
denial, despite the prevalence of consular nonreviewability. 19 In 1972, in
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 20 the Supreme Court first identified the possibility of
an exception to consular nonreviewability when it reviewed a visa waiver
denial because the denial implicated the First Amendment rights of U.S.citizen professors. 21 The Court limited review to a determination of whether
17. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769–70 (1972) (explaining Congress’s
plenary power over immigrant admission and exclusion decisions, but noting that Congress
has delegated some of its authority in this area to the executive branch). In Mandel, the U.S.
Supreme Court emphasized that the judiciary’s inability to scrutinize a consular officer’s
decision is based on decades of precedent reaffirming the executive and legislative branches’
power in the immigration realm. See id. at 766 (insisting that Congress’s immigration policy is
“enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial intervention,” and that this
practice “is settled by our previous adjudications” (quoting Lem Moon Sing v. United States,
158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895))); see also United States ex rel. London v. Phelps, 22 F.2d 288, 290
(2d Cir. 1927) (holding that there is no formal administrative or judicial review of consular
decisions); Nafziger, supra note 16, at 16 (acknowledging that section 104(a) of the INA
makes visa denials controversial because the section is often cited as curtailing administrative
review); Note, Judicial Review of Visa Denials: Reexamining Consular Nonreviewability, 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1137, 1155 (1977) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s cases involving consular
nonreviewability as “divin[ing] from the power to set policy concerning alien entries, a power
to implement that policy free from all judicial scrutiny,” and observing that such “reasoning
has persisted . . . despite the evolution of a common law presumption in favor of judicial
review, the codification of that presumption in the [Administrative Procedure Act], and
independent developments in the area of procedural due process”); Maria Zas, Comment,

Consular Absolutism: The Need for Judicial Review in the Adjudication of Immigrant Visas
for Permanent Residence, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 577, 588 (2004) (discussing how the

doctrine of consular absolutism “immunizes” consular officers from judicial review). Section
104(a) of the INA suggests that the Secretary of State does not have the power to
administratively review consular officers’ decisions. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
Pub. L. No. 92-414, § 104(a), 66 Stat. 163, 174–75 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a) (2012)).
18. See infra text accompanying note 22 (discussing Mandel’s limited standard of review).
Under Mandel, a court can review a consular officer’s decision only to determine whether
there was a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for the visa denial. Mandel, 408 U.S. at
770; see also Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS, 564 F.2d 417, 428 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating
that a consular officer’s decision cannot be reversed because the decision will not be
reviewed).
19. See, e.g., Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770 (finding that if a consular officer offers a “facially
legitimate and bona fide reason” for a denial, then a court will not “look behind” the consular
officer’s discretion); see also Wildes, supra note 16, at 898 (conceding that Mandel offers a
“minimal standard of judicial scrutiny” but noting that the decision was a “significant
departure” from earlier cases that “complete[ly] abdicat[ed]” all judicial review of an
immigration officer’s discretion).
20. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
21. See id. at 754, 770 (holding that “when the Executive exercises this power negatively
on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will [not] look behind the
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the government or the consular officer provided a “facially legitimate and
bona fide reason” for the visa denial. 22
Courts have interpreted Mandel to create an exception to consular
nonreviewability, but they disagree about when a U.S.-citizen petitioner can
seek review under this exception. 23 For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in Bustamante v. Mukasey 24 and in Din v. Kerry25
acknowledged that a foreign spouse’s visa denial implicates the fundamental
marital and familial rights of a U.S. citizen such that Mandel’s limited review
applied. 26 Other courts, nevertheless, refuse to find that a visa denial
implicates such fundamental rights and do not apply Mandel review.27
When faced with a visa denial claim, some federal courts either erroneously
apply the doctrine of consular nonreviewability or interpret Mandel in a
manner contradictory to longstanding Supreme Court precedent defending
the fundamental right to freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life, the right to live with immediate and extended family, and the
constitutional due process protections afforded to U.S. citizens.
This Comment argues that the visa denial of a U.S. citizen’s family
member implicates that citizen’s fundamental Fifth Amendment due process
rights—therefore allowing judicial review of the denial—because the Supreme
Court has long recognized the liberty interests involved in marriage and in
living with one’s immediate and extended family. Without the opportunity
for either an administrative appeal or judicial review of a visa denial, a single
consular officer can force a U.S. citizen, like Din, to live apart from her
closest family member or to relinquish a stable life and employment in the
United States to move abroad with her family member. An erroneous or
unjustified visa denial, perhaps with a pretextual reason underlying the
decision, could disintegrate a family and lead to financial and emotional
hardship for the U.S.-citizen petitioner. Allowing judicial review of visa
exercise of that discretion”). Implicitly, by granting certiorari to the issue, the Supreme Court
suggested that when a U.S. citizen’s First Amendment rights may be implicated, a consular
officer’s decision must be “facially legitimate and bona fide.” Id. at 770.
22. Id. at 770.
23. Compare Burrafato v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 523 F.2d 554, 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1975)
(denying standing to a U.S.-citizen spouse and asserting consular nonreviewability over a visa
review claim), with Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2008)
(determining that a U.S. citizen had standing to seek review of her foreign spouse’s visa denial
because the denial implicated the U.S. citizen’s fundamental right to “[f]reedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life”).
24. 531 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2008).
25. 718 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014).
26. Id. at 868; Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1061–62.
27. See infra Part I.B.2 (providing an overview of cases that do and do not recognize that
the denial of a U.S. citizen’s foreign spouse’s visa implicates that citizen’s protected liberty
interests, thus triggering Mandel review (or not)).
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denials would not entitle a foreign citizen to entry into the United States, nor
would it afford a U.S. citizen the right to have his or her foreign family
member enter the United States. Rather, judicial review of these visas would
allow a U.S.-citizen petitioner to receive due process protections when a
government action infringes on the fundamental rights of a U.S. citizen.
Moreover, the fundamental rights implicated by the denial of a family
member’s visa involve higher stakes than those involved in Mandel, when the
Court implicitly accepted that U.S.-citizen professors could seek review of a
foreign professor’s visa waiver denial.
Part I provides an overview of the steps involved in securing an immediate
relative and a family-sponsored immigrant visa. It then examines the
doctrine of consular nonreviewability, discusses the Mandel exception to
nonreviewability, and provides an overview of federal court decisions
interpreting Mandel. This Part also summarizes Supreme Court precedent
affirming the individual liberty interests present in marriage and in the right
to live together as a family. Part II analyzes how federal courts have
expanded Mandel’s scope. Part II also examines how Supreme Court
decisions upholding the liberty interests in marriage and in the right to live
together as a family bolster judicial review for family reunification visas. This
Comment concludes that the Supreme Court should follow the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation of Mandel in Bustamante and Din and allow a U.S.citizen petitioner to seek review of a spouse’s or family member’s visa denial
because a consular officer’s visa denial implicates that U.S. citizen’s
fundamental marital and familial rights.
I.

BACKGROUND

This Part provides an overview of the procedures involved in securing an
immediate relative and family-sponsored immigrant visa. It also discusses
the origins of the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. After discussing the
Mandel exception to nonreviewability, this Part also provides an overview of
federal court decisions that have applied Mandel review. Finally, this Part
summarizes the Supreme Court’s decisions recognizing the fundamental
rights involved in marital and familial relationships and in living with one’s
extended family.

A. Overview of Visa Adjudication and Consular Officer Procedures
Family members of U.S. citizens are eligible for one of two types of family
reunification visas: an immediate relative or a family-sponsored visa. A U.S.
citizen’s spouse, parents, adopted orphan children, and unmarried children
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under the age of twenty-one are eligible for an immediate relative visa.28
Immediate relatives are exempt from the statutory provisions that limit the
annual number of immigrants that can enter the United States from a
specific visa category. 29 Thus, an immediate relative can enter the United
States as soon as a consular officer approves his or her visa. To qualify for a
family-sponsored immigrant visa, a noncitizen must fall into one of four
categories specified in the INA: (1) unmarried sons and daughters of U.S.
citizens, (2) spouses and unmarried sons and daughter of legal permanent
residents (LPRs), (3) married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, and (4)
brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens if the citizens are over the age of twentyone. 30 Family-sponsored immigrant visas, however, are subject to strict
statutory provisions that limit the number of visas that may be issued each
year. 31
The procedures for filing an immediate relative visa petition and a familysponsored visa petition are similar. 32 First, the U.S. citizen, commonly
referred to as the petitioner, must submit an I-130 form—the visa petition—to
USCIS on behalf of the noncitizen, who is often called the beneficiary or
28. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (defining “immediate relatives” as the parents,
spouse, and child of a U.S. citizen). U.S. citizens who petition for their parents must be at
least twenty-one years old at the time they file their applications. Id. Children petitioned by
U.S.-citizen parents must be under the age of twenty-one and unmarried. Id. § 1101(b)(1)(E).
An orphan child adopted abroad and an orphan to be adopted in the United States by a U.S.
citizen is also eligible for an immediate relative visa. Id. § 1101(b)(1)(F).
29. See id. § 1151(b) (listing and describing the immigrant categories that are not subject
to annual visa limitations, including immediate relatives).
30. See id. § 1153(a) (describing the four subcategories of family-sponsored visas and the
number of visas annually allocated to each subcategory).
31. See generally id. § 1151(c) (detailing the number of family-sponsored visas that may
be issued each fiscal year). The annual limit of family-sponsored visas is 480,000 minus the
number of immediate relatives who were admitted in the preceding fiscal year plus any
employment-based visas that were available but unused during the preceding fiscal year. Id.
32. The primary difference between an immediate relative and family-sponsored visa is
that family-sponsored visas are subject to annual numerical limitations. See supra notes 29–31
and accompanying text (distinguishing between immediate relative and family-sponsored
visas); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.1 (2014) (providing an overview of the processes for obtaining
immediate relative and family-sponsored visas). A family-sponsored visa applicant has to wait
until a visa becomes available on the Department of State’s Visa Bulletin because of the
annual visa limitations. Visa Bulletin: Immigrant Numbers for March 2014, U.S. DEP’T ST. 1
(Feb. 7, 2014), http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin_march2014.pdf.
The Visa Bulletin indicates from which dates of visa submissions the State Department is
processing visas. Id. USCIS will issue visa applicants a “priority date” that indicates the date
on which the application was filed. Id. Each month, the Visa Bulletin reflects the priority
date from which the Department of State is processing visas. See id. For example, if the Visa
Bulletin lists August 15, 2001, then the State Department is processing visas submitted to
USCIS on that date. See id. at 2. If an applicant submits an application this year for that
same category, the applicant will have to wait almost thirteen years for the State Department to
process the visa. Id.
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intending immigrant. 33 The I-130 establishes the claimed relationship
between the petitioner and the beneficiary. Next, after USCIS receives and
approves the visa petition, USCIS sends the visa petition to the State
Department’s National Visa Center. 34 After processing the visa petition, the
NVC sends the petition to a consular post in the beneficiary’s home country
where the beneficiary must interview with a consular officer to receive final
approval of the visa. 35 Together, these procedures may take several years.36
In the case of a family-sponsored immigrant who is subject to annual visa
limitations, the process may be even longer because the applicant has to wait
for a visa to become available. 37
The interview with a consular officer is the last step in the series of
administrative procedures. The consular officer can approve the visa,
request more information from the applicant, or deny the visa. 38 If a
consular officer denies a visa, the consular officer must inform the denied
applicant of the legal provisions under which the denial is based and must
provide a factual basis for the visa denial in writing. 39 An exception to this
33. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (describing the procedures U.S. petitioners and visa
beneficiaries need to complete to file a visa application).
34. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(iii)(F)(3) (noting that after USCIS approves the visa petition,
USCIS forwards the approved petition to the NVC); see also The Immigrant Visa Process,
supra note 4 (showing the steps a U.S. citizen must complete after he or she submits a visa
petition to USCIS).
35. See 8 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (“[A] consular officer may issue . . . to an immigrant who
has made proper application therefor, an immigrant visa which shall consist of the application
provided for in section 1202 . . . .”).
36. See Suzy Khimm, How Long Is the Immigration “Line”? As Long as 24 Years.,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
31,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/31/how-long-is-the-immigrationline-as-long-as-24-years (describing the long wait times for visas as a result of bureaucratic
delays as well as noting, for example, that the visa wait time for a person from Mexico can
exceed fifteen years).
37. See Visa Bulletin: Immigrant Numbers for March 2014, supra note 32, at 2 (showing
that the siblings of a U.S.-citizen petitioner from the Philippines will have to wait nearly
twenty-four years for their visas to become available whereas the spouse or child of a legal
permanent resident will have to wait only six months).
38. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(iii)(F)(3) (detailing how the State Department will decide on
petitions); 22 C.F.R. § 42.81 (explaining the State Department’s visa refusal procedure); see
also The Immigrant Visa Process: After the Interview, U.S. DEP’T ST.,
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/immigrate/immigrant-process/interview/after.html
(last visited Jan. 20, 2015) (instructing applicants on how to proceed after their petitions have
been approved or denied and noting that, for a visa denial, additional administrative
processing is sometimes required to conclude the application process).
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b); see also 22 C.F.R. § 42.81 (stating that if a consular officer denies
a visa, he or she must have a basis in either INA section 212(a), which lists the grounds of
inadmissibility; INA section 221(g), which concerns missing documents; or another applicable
law). All visa denials must conform to 22 C.F.R. § 40.6, which provides:
A visa can be refused only upon a ground specifically set out in the law or
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rule exists for those visas denied under INA section 212(a)(2)–(3), the
criminal and security-related inadmissibility provisions. 40 State Department
regulations provide that consular officers must send denied applications to a
supervisory officer within the consulate designated to review denials. 41 The
supervisory officer must then review the case and affirm or reverse the
decision no later than thirty days after the consular officer made her initial
decision. 42
In practice, it is unclear if these procedures actually occur. 43 The Foreign
Affairs Manual (FAM), the State Department’s organizational guidelines for
consular officers overseas, states that if the basis for refusal “is not entirely
straightforward, the supervisory officer should review the case
immediately.” 44 To overcome a visa ineligibility, the State Department will
consider any new evidence without additional costs to the applicant or
petitioner if presented within one year of the visa denial. 45 This is possible
only when the applicant knows the basis for the denial and knows how to
produce evidence to refute the government’s evidence. While these internal
review provisions may curb a consular officer’s discretion, U.S.-citizen
implementing regulations. The term “reason to believe”, as used in INA 221(g),

shall be considered to require a determination based upon facts or circumstances
which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the applicant is ineligible to
receive a visa as provided in the INA and as implemented by the regulations.
22 C.F.R. § 40.6 (emphasis added). See generally Nafziger, supra note 16, at 20–21
(discussing the State Department’s internal review procedures).
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(3).
41. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 42.81 n.1.2 (2008)
[hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 9 FAM]. The Foreign Affairs Manual consists of internal
organizational policies that have some practical binding effect on State Department officials.
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 1111.1 (2013) (stating that the FAM
includes “procedures and policies . . . relating to [State] Department management and
personnel” which “derive their authority from statutes, Executive orders, . . . and Department
policies”). It is, however, unlikely that a court would find a document like this legally binding
in a suit from a member of the public against a State Department employee for failure to
comply. See Email from Jeffrey Lubbers, Professor, Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law, to
Gabriela Baca (Feb. 20, 2014, 12:34 a.m. EST) (on file with author).
42. See 22 CFR § 42.81(c) (requiring the review occur “without delay”); see also U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, 9 FAM, supra note 41, at 42.81 n.1.2 (providing the thirty-day requirement).
43. See Nafziger, supra note 16, at 94–95 (stating that regulations require senior consular
officers to review visa denials, but admitting that the “high volume of applications at some
posts [has] resulted in review of only a random sample of denials”). Budgetary constraints
may also hinder the adequacy of informal procedures. See id. at 58 (noting that consular
officers have limited time to detail the reasons for a visa denial and observing that a
supervisory officer reviewing an informal administrative appeal of a consular officer’s decision
would not be able to fairly examine the record to determine whether a decision was justified
because limited resources prevent consular officers from documenting an extensive record
about each visa decision).
44. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 9 FAM, supra note 41, at 42.81 n.1.2.
45. 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e).
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petitioners and foreign applicants who do not receive notice of the grounds
for their ineligibility, such as those applicants denied for potential links to
terrorism-related activities or those whose visa is denied a second time, have
no independent oversight, administrative appeals process, or opportunity for
meaningful judicial review.

B. Plenary Power and the Origins of Consular Nonreviewability
Generally, federal courts have considered a consular officer’s decision
unreviewable and, thus, have refused to review a visa denial. 46 Known as the
doctrine of consular nonreviewability or consular absolutism, this practice
first emerged in two appellate cases in the 1920s and from the INA’s grant of
broad discretion to consular officers. In United States ex rel. London v.
Phelps, 47 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in dicta, refused
to review a visa denial because of the diplomatic nature of granting and
denying visas.48 In United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 49 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit argued that review was
unavailable because the Immigration Act of 1924 lacked a provision granting
review over consular officers’ decisions. 50 Section 104(a) of the INA states
that
[t]he Secretary of State shall be charged with the administration and the
enforcement of the provisions of this chapter and all other immigration
and nationality laws relating to (1) the powers, duties, and functions of
diplomatic and consular officers of the United States, except those powers,

46. See, e.g., Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159–60 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“For
the greater part of this century, our court has therefore refused to review visa decisions of
consular officials.”); Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin, 800 F.2d 970, 970 (9th Cir. 1986)
(“The doctrine of nonreviewability of a consul’s decision to grant or deny a visa stems from
the Supreme Court’s confirming that the legislative power of Congress over the admission of
aliens is virtually complete.”); Rivera de Gomez v. Kissinger, 534 F.2d 518, 519 (2d Cir. 1976)
(per curiam) (affirming a district court’s decision to withhold jurisdiction to review a consular
officer’s decision because Supreme Court precedent foreclosed it); Pena v. Kissinger, 409 F.
Supp. 1182, 1184, 1187–88 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (recognizing that a lawful permanent resident
petitioning for a foreign spouse has standing to seek review but holding that Mandel and the
doctrine of consular nonreviewability preclude any meaningful review).
47. 22 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1927).
48. See id. at 290 (“Whether the consul has acted reasonably or unreasonably is not for
us to determine. Unjustifiable refusal . . . may be ground for diplomatic complaint by the
nation whose subject has been discriminated against. . . . It is beyond the jurisdiction of the
court.”).
49. 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
50. See id. at 986 (“We are not able to find any provision of the immigration laws which
provides for an official review of the action of the consular officers in such case by a cabinet
officer or other authority.”); see also Nafziger, supra note 16, at 30 (noting that the court’s
interpretation of the Immigration Act of 1924 later led to a negative inference of review of
consular officer’s decisions in section 104(a) of the INA).
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duties, and functions conferred upon the consular officers relating to the
granting or refusal of visas . . . . 51

Courts interpret this provision as granting consular officers broad authority
over visa decisions. 52
The political branches’ plenary power over immigration matters further
solidified the practice of consular nonreviewability. 53 The Supreme Court’s
decisions in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 54 Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 55 and Fong Yue Ting v. United States 56 held that the political
branches’ power over immigration matters is rooted in sovereignty (delegated
by the Constitution), their war powers, and their powers over international
relations. 57 Scholars interpret the plenary power doctrine to establish that
Congress can prescribe the terms for the admission and removal of
noncitizens and that the executive branch has unreviewable discretion to act
within those terms.58 As a result, courts have deferred to Congress and the
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
52. See Nafziger, supra note 16, at 30 (arguing that it is incorrect to infer nonreviewability
from section 104(a) of the INA because that section merely confirms a consular officer’s
powers rather than points to nonreviewability or even broad discretion).
53. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769–70 (1972) (“[P]lenary
congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly
established.”); Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (interpreting
the plenary power doctrine to preclude judicial review over “the political nature of visa
determinations”); see also Nafziger, supra note 16, at 30–31, 38–49 (chronicling the various
interpretations of and rationales for the plenary power doctrine to explain why courts limit
judicial review over consular decisions); Tatyana E. Delgado, Note, Leaving the Doctrine of
Consular Absolutism Behind, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 55, 55–56 (2010) (explaining that in
granting or denying a visa, a consular officer is exercising power delegated by Congress, which
has the power “to exclude [noncitizens] altogether from the United States”); Edward B. Quist,
Note, Justice for the Alien: The Adequacy of the Consular Visa Issuance System, 1986
IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 457, 460 (1986) (describing the origins of consular
nonreviewability as “puzzling”); Zas, supra note 17, at 590–91 (conceding that courts that rely
on consular nonreviewability often state that Congress’s plenary power over immigration
precludes review). But see Mandel, 408 U.S. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“There were no
rights of Americans involved in any of the old alien exclusion cases, and therefore their broad
counsel about deference to the political branches is inapplicable.”).
54. (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
55. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
56. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
57. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713–14, 721–22, 724 (extending the Court’s
reasoning in Chae Chan Ping and Nishimura Ekiu to deportation and relying on the political
branches’ power over foreign policy decisions to justify its reasoning); Nishimura Ekiu, 142
U.S. at 659 (underscoring that an essential element of a nation’s sovereignty is the ability to
decide the conditions for who may or may not enter the nation); Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at
602–03 (recognizing Congress’s implied sovereign power to exclude foreigners even though
the Court was ambivalent about the precise source of this power).
58. See, e.g., Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 329–30, 339
(1909) (stating that Congress has complete power over decisions to admit aliens); Lem Moon
Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895) (reiterating that Congress has the power to “to
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executive branch to define the due process rights available to noncitizens
and, oftentimes, citizens affected by federal immigration law. 59 As one
scholar notes, however, courts also adhere to the plenary power doctrine to
refuse standing to noncitizens and U.S. citizens asserting constitutional
challenges to immigration laws. 60

1.

Plenary power and noncitizen standing in federal courts

The Supreme Court has relied on the plenary power doctrine to limit
judicial review over constitutional challenges to immigration laws. 61 While
courts have recognized that some procedural due process protections are
available to noncitizens, 62 the extent of those protections depends on whether
the noncitizen is within the territorial bounds of the United States, at the
border, or outside of the country. 63 The Supreme Court has held that
prescribe the terms” for the admission and exclusion of foreigners, while the executive branch
has the power to enforce the terms “without judicial intervention”); see also Nafziger, supra
note 16, at 30–31, 39 (chronicling the late 18th century and early 19th century cases which
established the plenary power doctrine and stating that “[a]fter these pronouncements . . . the
apotheosis of Congress and the genuflection of the courts continued”).
59. See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
373, 375 (2004) (suggesting that most scholars interpret the plenary power doctrine “to reflect
judicial deference to, or a lack of constitutional limitations on, Congress’s exercise of its
immigration power,” but arguing that courts have incorrectly interpreted the plenary power
doctrine to preclude citizens from challenging the constitutionality of immigration laws);
Nafziger, supra note 16, at 30–31 (indicating that courts have applied the doctrine by deferring
to Congress and the executive branch).
60. See Cox, supra note 59, at 386 (explaining that courts use the plenary power doctrine
as a standing doctrine to insulate themselves from claims by noncitizens by arguing that the
noncitizens do not have a right to be in court or to raise such claims).
61. Id. at 381 (stating that “the Supreme Court has invoked the doctrine to reject
constitutional challenges to wide-ranging policies, including the statutory exclusion of Chinese
nationals; the indefinite detention, without a hearing, of an alien seeking to enter America;
and the ideological exclusion of scholars” (footnotes omitted)).
62. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 22 (1982) (affording a legal permanent
resident procedural due process protections); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1977)
(affirming that the Court’s precedent indicates “limited judicial responsibility” despite
Congress’s power over admission and exclusion of noncitizens); Yamataya v. Fisher (The
Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 98, 100–02 (1903) (granting procedural due process
protections for a noncitizen unlawfully present in the United States for four days but still
finding her deportable because the government did not deny her due process).
63. Compare Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100–02 (finding that a noncitizen who unlawfully
entered the United States could be deported because she had an opportunity to be heard and
was not denied due process), with Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
207, 214–15 (1953) (holding that an immigration officer could indefinitely exclude, without a
hearing, a legal permanent resident who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years
but who posed a national security threat); see also Cox, supra note 59, at 380 n.20 (“While it
may seem straightforward to distinguish aliens inside the United States from those outside, it is
important to note that the ‘entry fiction’ doctrine in immigration law permits the government
to treat some aliens who are physically present in the United States as though they stand at the
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noncitizens already in the United States are entitled to more due process
protections than noncitizens at the border or those outside of the country
and applying for admission.64
For example, the Supreme Court in Yamataya v. Fisher 65 found that a
noncitizen who entered the United States unlawfully but was present in the
United States for four days could not be deported without an opportunity to
be heard. 66 By contrast, in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 67 the
Supreme Court held that the foreign spouse of a U.S. citizen detained at a
port of entry was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to contest the reasons
for her exclusion. 68 Mrs. Knauff’s admission was perceived to be prejudicial
to U.S. interests during wartime, but the Court still reasoned that the
executive branch reasonably applied the provisions barring her admission
and stated that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” 69 In Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 70 the Court found three legal permanent residents deportable
as a result of their former affiliations with the Communist Party. 71 The
Supreme Court held that immigration laws supporting their deportation were
constitutional, reasoning that immigration policies should be “immune from

threshold of entry.”). But see Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of
Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933,

1004–10 (1995) (suggesting that judicial review and due process for noncitizens should not
rely on the plenary power doctrine and outdated theories of “territorial fiction” because all
people, regardless of their geographic location, should be deemed “persons” under the Due
Process Clause).
64. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 539–40, 542–43
(1950) (protecting from judicial scrutiny a discretionary executive branch decision that barred
a noncitizen spouse who arrived at a port of entry and sought admission).
65. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
66. See id. at 100 (explaining that administrative officers may not deny due process when
executing a statute that implicates a person’s liberty interests).
67. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
68. See id. at 544, 546 (“Under the immigration laws and regulations applicable to all
aliens seeking entry into the United States during the national emergency, she was excluded
by the Attorney General without a hearing [and] . . . we have no authority to retry th[at]
determination . . . .”).
69. See id. at 544. Although the Supreme Court’s decision ultimately prevented Mrs.
Knauff from entering the United States, pressure from congressional officials and the public
later convinced the Attorney General to reopen Mrs. Knauff’s case. See Weisselberg, supra
note 63, at 958 n.127, 961. Eventually, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) allowed
Mrs. Knauff to present evidence that she did not pose a national security threat. Id. at 963.
The BIA determined that there was no substantial evidence to justify her exclusion and
ultimately allowed her to seek permanent residence in the United States. Id. at 963–64.
70. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
71. Id. at 581.
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judicial inquiry.” 72 And, in Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Court refused to grant
standing to a noncitizen visa applicant who the government had excluded for
his ideological beliefs because he had “no constitutional right of entry.” 73
These decisions underscore the Supreme Court’s adherence to the
legislative and executive branches’ plenary power over immigration matters.
Importantly, however, the decisions highlight what one scholar has identified
as the three manifestations of the plenary power doctrine: to justify judicial
deference to the political branches, to grant unlimited power over
immigration matters to Congress and the executive branch, and to exclude
noncitizens from standing in federal courts. 74 As such, federal courts have
used the plenary power doctrine to justify consular nonreviewability largely
by refusing noncitizens, and sometimes U.S. citizens, standing in court.75 As
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Mandel demonstrated, however, the Court
avoided granting the noncitizen standing by instead granting the U.S. citizens
standing because the U.S. citizens’ fundamental rights were implicated in the
visa denial. 76

2.

Mandel exception to consular nonreviewability
Despite longstanding adherence to consular nonreviewability, in 1972, the
Supreme Court in Mandel first recognized that a denial of a visa waiver
might sometimes merit limited judicial review. 77 In Mandel, a group of U.S.citizen professors invited Ernest Mandel, a Belgian journalist and author, to
speak at a conference at Stanford University. 78 Although Mr. Mandel was
not a member of the Communist Party, he was known as “a revolutionary
Marxist” who advocated for world communism. 79 The Consul in Belgium

72. See id. at 589, 591 (exercising judicial restraint and stating that a court must tolerate
Congress’s policies even if the court disagrees with Congress).
73. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); see infra Part I.B.2 (discussing how
the Court in Mandel instead granted standing to the U.S. citizens who were petitioning for Mr.
Mandel’s visa).
74. See Cox, supra note 59, at 381–82 (insisting that courts and immigration scholars
generally do not divide the plenary power doctrine into this clear-cut typology).
75. See, e.g., Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762 (asserting that Mr. Mandel lacks standing because
he has “no constitutional right of entry” and is thus a “symbolic” plaintiff (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643, 647 n.3 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Centeno v.
Shultz, 817 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)) (expressing that a visa applicant does not
“have standing to seek either administrative or judicial review of the consular officer’s decision
to deny him a visa”); Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1114 n.4 (1st Cir. 1988) (interpreting
Mandel to hold that a noncitizen does not have standing to bring a constitutional challenge to
a visa denial in U.S. federal courts).
76. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762.
77. Id. at 769.
78. Id. at 756–57.
79. Id. at 756 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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denied Mr. Mandel’s visa, and the Attorney General refused to grant him a
waiver because Mr. Mandel had violated the conditions of a previous entry
into the United States.80 Soon after, Mr. Mandel and the U.S.-citizen
professors who invited him to the U.S. filed a complaint in federal court
alleging that the statutes barring Mr. Mandel’s entry and the Attorney
General’s refusal to grant a visa waiver deprived the professors, all U.S.
citizens, of their First and Fifth Amendment rights. 81
In finding that it could review Mr. Mandel’s visa denial, the Supreme
Court implicitly engaged in a two-part inquiry. First, it determined that the
U.S. plaintiffs had standing in federal court to seek review of the visa waiver
denial because the government’s actions implicated their First Amendment
rights to have Mr. Mandel enter and speak in the United States. 82 Second,
after finding such rights implicated, the Court stated that it could review the
decision to ensure that the government had provided a “facially legitimate
and bona fide reason” for the denial. 83 Ultimately, the Court in Mandel
found that the government’s reasoning—that Mr. Mandel had violated a
previous condition of admission—was a facially legitimate reason for denying
the visa waiver and, thus, that no further review was necessary. 84

80. Id. at 759. The plaintiffs alleged that the Attorney General’s stated reason for finding
that Mr. Mandel violated the terms of a previous entry into the United States was not the real
basis for the government’s decision to deny Mr. Mandel a visa waiver. Id. at 760. The
plaintiffs believed that the Attorney General excluded Mr. Mandel because of his ideological
beliefs and, therefore, asserted that the visa denial was not based on a facially legitimate and
bona fide reason. Id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall agreed with the plaintiff and
argued that the visa waiver denial was a “sham” to cover the government’s real basis for
excluding Mr. Mandel: his political ideology. See id. at 778–79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. See Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620, 622 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev’d sub nom.
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (arguing that the statutory provisions in question
and visa denial failed to provide the professors adequate due process protections or to guard
against arbitrary executive branch actions).
82. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 769–70 (recognizing that First Amendment protections and
the right to free speech includes a U.S. citizen’s right to receive information from foreign
speakers); cf. Judy Wurtzel, Note, First Amendment Limitations on the Exclusion of Aliens,
62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 149, 161 n.89 (1987) (distinguishing Mandel and United States ex rel.
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904), where the Supreme Court held that a noncitizen
could not contest his deportation on First Amendment grounds because a noncitizen does not
have “an independent constitutional right to enter and speak”).
83. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 769–70. The Court stated it could “neither look behind the
exercise of [a consular officer’s] discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the
First Amendment interests” of the U.S. citizen plaintiffs where the official offers “a facially
legitimate and bona fide reason” for his negative use of discretion. Id. at 770. The Court
emphasized the limited procedural due process protections available to noncitizens and cited
the Court’s long line of cases endorsing the plenary power doctrine. Id. at 766–67.
84. See id. at 769 (finding that the immigration officer validly exercised his powers when
he denied Mr. Mandel’s visa waiver after he concluded that Mr. Mandel violated the terms of
entry on a visa previously issued to him).
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While subsequent cases and scholars have interpreted the Court’s
decision in Mandel as having carved out an exception to consular
nonreviewability, the Court rooted its limited holding in the plenary power
doctrine. In his dissent, Justice Marshall cautioned against the majority’s
reliance on the plenary power doctrine to limit the review given to the U.S.
citizens’ claims. 85 Justice Marshall, with the majority of the Court seeming to
agree, argued that Mr. Mandel’s case was easily distinguishable from the
“old” plenary power cases because none of those cases involved the rights of
U.S. citizens. 86 Even in the aftermath of Knauff—the plenary power case
decided twenty years before Mandel that did involve the rights of a U.S.citizen spouse—Congress, the public, and the Department of Justice
demonstrated their disagreement with an immigration official’s raw and
absolute power to deny admission to a foreign national with strong ties to the
United States.87 Despite Justice Marshall’s dissent, the majority stated that it
would not balance the U.S. citizens’ rights with the reasons given for the
denial and held that the government offered a valid reason. 88
In sum, Mandel offered a two-part inquiry for when review applies: first, a
court must determine whether a U.S. citizen’s First Amendment rights are
affected by a visa waiver denial, and second, if such rights are implicated, the
court must then determine if the denial was based on a facially legitimate and
bona fide reason. 89 The Court in Mandel did not provide further guidance
about the scope of its decision. 90 Does the decision apply only to visa waivers

85. See id. at 777–79 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (finding that the government has not
provided a “compelling governmental interest” to justify infringing on U.S. citizens’ First
Amendment rights (emphasis added)).
Justice Marshall argued that a “legitimate
governmental interest[] cannot override” the long-established standard for justifying a burden
on a U.S. citizen’s fundamental rights. Id. at 777 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. See id. at 781–82 (challenging the majority’s plenary power reasoning and observing
that the majority’s use of the cases to limit review was misplaced because all of the cases to
which the majority cited involved the rights of noncitizens).
87. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (grappling with the irony in the final
outcome of United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, which, despite the Supreme Court’s
holding, ultimately resulted in the executive branch recognizing that it did not have substantial
evidence to exclude Mrs. Knauff).
88. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770 (holding that the government need only provide a
“facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for denying a visa and explaining that in the
presence of such a justification, a court does not need to balance the strength of the
government’s reason against a U.S. citizen’s First Amendment rights).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 82–84 (describing the Supreme Court’s findings
in Mandel).
90. See Nafziger, supra note 16, at 33–34 (asserting that, although unclear, the Court in
Mandel has simultaneously promoted judicial abstention when it reiterated the doctrine of
consular nonreviewability and encouraged review by finding that some review exists through
the “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” standard (internal quotation marks omitted));
Wurtzel, supra note 82, at 163 (“Mandel leaves many questions unanswered.”).
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or to all consular decisions? After Mandel, it became well settled that
noncitizens, alone, do not have a right to review of a visa denial. 91 But, does
review apply when a U.S. citizen’s “constitutionally protected rights” are
implicated? This question has become a source of disagreement among
federal courts.

a.

Rights recognized under Mandel’s first inquiry
The Court in Mandel exclusively addressed the U.S.-citizen professors’
First Amendment claims.92 The Court neither limited nor elaborated on
what other rights would trigger review. 93 Subsequent cases have widely
recognized similar First Amendment claims as triggering Mandel review, 94
but courts are in conflict about whether Mandel applies to plaintiffs who
assert a violation of their constitutionally protected interests in the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause, such as the right to marriage.95 Some
courts recognize that a visa denial involving a foreign spouse and a U.S.
citizen, implicates a protected interest in marriage and family life, thereby
allowing for Mandel review. 96 However, other courts have held that such
denial does not implicate the marriage rights of a U.S. citizen spouse and,
therefore, does not trigger Mandel review. 97

i.

First Amendment cases triggering Mandel review

Courts have consistently recognized that visa denials implicating the First
Amendment rights of U.S. citizens merit Mandel review. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held in Allende v. Shultz 98 that U.S. citizens who

91. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762; see Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1114 n.4 (1st Cir.
1988) (stating that Mandel held that a noncitizen cannot challenge the denial of a visa on
constitutional grounds and that a noncitizen’s participation in visa denial litigation is “purely
symbolic”).
92. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 759, 762.
93. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s ambiguity concerning
whether Mandel applies to more than First Amendment claims).
94. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 2009)
(applying Mandel review to a First Amendment claim); Allende, 845 F.2d at 115–16 (same);
Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1074–76 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same), aff’d, 484 U.S. 1
(1987) (per curiam).
95. Compare Burrafato v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 523 F.2d 554, 555–57 (2d Cir. 1975)
(refusing to recognize a U.S. citizen’s fundamental right to marriage as a trigger for Mandel
review), with Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that a U.S.
citizen’s fundamental rights are implicated by the denial of her foreign spouse’s visa).
96. E.g., Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1062.
97. See, e.g., Burrafato, 523 F.2d at 556–57 (asserting that a U.S. citizen lacks standing to
bring a Mandel claim based on the right to marriage); Hermina Sague v. United States, 416 F.
Supp. 217, 220 (D.P.R. 1976) (same).
98. 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988).
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invited Hortensia de Allende, the widow of a former Chilean president, to
speak in the United States were entitled to judicial review of the visa denial
because the denial violated their First Amendment rights to “receive
information.” 99 The First Circuit extended Mandel review to Allende’s claim
and implicitly recognized that Mandel review applies to both visa denials and
visa waiver denials. 100
Similarly, the Second Circuit in American Academy of Religion v.
Napolitano 101 held that Mandel review applied to a consular officer’s denial
of a Swiss-born Islamic scholar’s visa because the U.S.-citizen plaintiffs who
invited him to speak asserted a valid First Amendment claim. 102 In Abourezk
v. Reagan, 103 the D.C. Circuit found that the plaintiffs raised valid statutory
and First Amendment claims challenging the visa denials of three foreign
citizens that the U.S.-citizen plaintiffs had invited to speak in the United
States.104 Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit in Saavedra Bruno v. Albright105
reiterated Abourezk’s holding that judicial review is appropriate under
Mandel only when U.S. citizens claim that a visa denial has violated their
constitutional rights. 106 In Bruno, a consular officer denied the visa of a
Bolivian national who was employed by a U.S. citizen because of the
Bolivian national’s alleged ties to drug trafficking. 107 The plaintiffs contended
that the consular officer’s denial violated the Administrative Procedure Act’s
(APA) presumption of judicial review. 108 In contrast to Abourezk, the court
in Bruno held that the U.S.-citizen plaintiffs, the noncitizen’s U.S.
employers, had not suffered a cognizable injury that would trigger review
under the APA or Mandel because the plaintiffs had not asserted a violation
of their constitutional rights. 109

99. See id. at 1112, 1114, 1120–21 (applying Mandel to a visa denial instead of a denial
of a waiver of inadmissibility as in Mandel).
100. Id. at 1120–21.
101. 573 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2009).
102. See id. at 117, 119, 125 (“We conclude that, where a plaintiff, with standing to do so,
asserts a First Amendment claim to have a visa applicant present views in this country, we
should apply Mandel to a consular officer’s denial of a visa.”).
103. 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (per curiam).
104. Id. at 1048–50.
105. 197 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
106. Id. at 1163.
107. Id. at 1155.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 1163–64 (arguing that the U.S.-citizen petitioners’ interests terminated as
soon as the petitioners filed a successful application with USCIS).
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ii. Cases endorsing the fundamental right to marriage as a trigger
for Mandel review
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly confirmed that a denial of a foreign
spouse’s visa triggers Mandel review. In Bustamante v. Mukasey, a U.S.
citizen asserted that she had a protected liberty interest in her marriage to a
foreign spouse and that this preexisting interest allowed her to seek Mandel
review after a consular officer denied her husband’s visa because the denial
impinged on her liberty interest. 110 The court held that Mandel review
applied because the plaintiff was a U.S. citizen “raising a constitutional
challenge” to a visa denial, which entitled her to review. 111 The court tacitly
endorsed the view that physical separation from a foreign spouse infringes on
a U.S. citizen’s right to freedom of personal choice in marriage and family
matters.112 Once the court declared that the spouse’s liberty interest was
implicated by the visa denial, it asserted that the court was entitled to engage
in a limited review of the reasons offered for the denial. 113
Similarly, in Din v. Kerry, the Ninth Circuit considered a U.S.-citizen
spouse’s claim for review of her husband’s visa denial. 114 In Din, a consular
officer denied the U.S. citizen’s spouse’s visa on account of the spouse’s
alleged ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan.115 The consular officer cited a
broad provision in the terrorism inadmissibility grounds to justify the
spouse’s exclusion but did not include further facts or an explanation
supporting the denial. 116 In reviewing Mrs. Din’s claims, the Ninth Circuit
confirmed that she had a protected interest in marriage to a foreign spouse
and applied Mandel review. 117 Unlike the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
110. Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008).
111. See id. (following a similar analysis as the First, Second, and D.C. Circuits to
conclude that a U.S. citizen’s constitutional challenge to a visa denial triggers Mandel review).
112. See id. (acknowledging but not elaborating on the idea that “[f]reedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life is, of course, one of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause”).
113. See id. (arguing that the government cannot infringe on liberty interests without
“constitutionally adequate procedures” (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 541 (1985))).
114. Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 859. A visa denial based on a terrorism-related inadmissibility ground is
exempt from the INA’s notice provisions. Thus, the consular officer did not have to explain
the reasons for the denial to the denied applicant. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying
text.
117. See Din, 718 F.3d at 860–61. The court in Din approvingly cited to Bustamante and
stated that Mrs. Din’s spouse’s right to judicial review was rooted in Mrs. Din’s more general
right to marriage. Id. at 860; cf. Atiffi v. Kerry, No. Civ. S-12-3002 LKK/DAN, 2013 WL
5954818 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2013) (recognizing that a “a citizen has a protected liberty interest
in marriage that entitles the citizen to review of the denial of a spouse’s visa” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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Bustamante, which held that the consular officer had provided a facially
legitimate reason for the visa denial, the Ninth Circuit in Din determined
that the consular officer’s bare citation to a broad statute was not a sufficient
reason for the denial. 118 Despite the Ninth Circuit’s unequivocal acceptance
that the consular officer’s decisions implicated Mrs. Din’s and Mrs.
Bustamante’s constitutionally protected interests, other circuits have been
less willing to find that such interests are at stake.
iii. Cases rejecting the fundamental right to marriage as a trigger
for Mandel review
The fundamental right to marriage and freedom of personal choice in
family life provides only a tenuous avenue into Mandel review in other
federal courts. In Burrafato v. U.S. Department of State, 119 an Italian citizen
waiting for a visa unlawfully entered the United States.120 The State
Department denied his visa before explaining the reasons for the denial.121
His U.S.-citizen wife alleged that the denial of his visa implicated her
constitutional rights.122
The Second Circuit declined to review her claim that the State
Department had not complied with its own regulations when it failed to
notify her and her spouse of the reasons for the denial. 123 Although the court
declared that Mandel requires a justification before excluding a noncitizen, it
ultimately determined that it did not have jurisdiction to review the claim
because it interpreted Mandel as only applying to First Amendment claims,
and the U.S.-citizen spouse only asserted a general violation of her
constitutional rights. 124 Similarly, in Hermina Sague v. United States, 125 a U.S.
citizen alleged that her spouse’s visa denial “deprived [her] of her right to live
within the territory of the United States with her husband and her family.”126
Unlike in Burrafato, where the U.S. citizen asserted a general violation of her
constitutional rights, in Hermina Sague, the U.S. citizen identified a specific

118. See Din, 718 F.3d at 862 (criticizing the government for not providing a facially
legitimate reason for denying Mrs. Din’s spouse’s visa and chastising the visa denial because it
was “completely void” of a justification).
119. 523 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1975).
120. Id. at 555.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 554–55.
123. Id. at 555–56.
124. Id. at 555–57 (distinguishing Burrafato’s case from other consular nonreviewability
cases after Mandel, all of which involved First Amendment claims within the federal courts’
jurisdictional purview, because Burrafato did not “implicate[]” constitutional rights over which
the federal courts have jurisdiction).
125. 416 F. Supp. 217 (D.P.R. 1976).
126. Id. at 220.
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constitutional right that the government infringed upon when it denied her
spouse’s visa. 127 Still, the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
held that a U.S.-citizen spouse did not have a constitutional right to have her
foreign spouse enter the United States and refused to recognize that Mandel
review applied. 128
Likewise, recent decisions by the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia have refused to recognize that a U.S.-citizen spouse’s rights are
implicated by the denial of his or her spouse’s visa. In Udugampola v.
Jacobs, 129 a consular officer denied Mr. Udugampola’s visa because of his
perceived ties to terrorism. 130 Mr. Udugampola, a Sri Lankan citizen, and his
U.S.-citizen wife and U.S.-citizen daughter sought review of the visa denial
under Mandel, asserting that the Fifth Amendment protects against arbitrary
government actions that infringe on his wife and daughter’s liberty interests.131
Mr. Udugampola’s wife alleged that she had a constitutionally protected
interest in her right to marry and in her marital relationship. 132 Further, Mr.
Udugampola’s daughter contended that she had a constitutionally protected
interest in maintaining a relationship with her father. 133 The court rejected
both claims, reasoning that his daughter’s rights were not implicated because
the visa denial was not aimed specifically at interfering with Mr.
Udugampola’s relationship with her and that his wife’s rights were not
implicated when her husband was denied entry. 134
Like in Udugampola, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
in Jathoul v. Clinton 135 found that a U.S.-citizen spouse’s marriage rights are
not implicated by a denial of her spouse’s visa, and, therefore, held that Mrs.
Jathoul failed to present a valid constitutional claim. 136 In Jathoul, a consular
officer found Mr. Jathoul inadmissible under terrorism-related

127. Id.
128. Id. (asserting that a U.S.-citizen spouse “who voluntarily chooses to marry” a foreign
citizen lacks a right “to have her alien spouse enter the United States” because to possess that
right would contravene U.S. sovereignty to decide who may enter the United States).
129. 795 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed, No. 11-5215, 2011 WL 5903822
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 17, 2011).
130. Id. at 98.
131. Id. at 98, 104–05.
132. Id. at 105.
133. Id. at 104.
134. See id. at 105 (“Courts have repeatedly held that these constitutional rights are not
implicated when one spouse is removed or denied entry into the United States . . . .”). The
court further stated that the denial did not infringe on Mrs. Udugampola’s marital relationship
with her husband because the government had “done nothing more than to say that the
residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States.” Id. at 106
(quoting Silverman v. Rogers, 437 F.2d 102, 107 (1st Cir. 1970)).
135. 880 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D.D.C. 2012).
136. Id. at 169.
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inadmissibility grounds. 137 Mrs. Jathoul, a U.S. citizen, argued that her
husband had never engaged in terrorist activities and that he was not given an
opportunity to present evidence to the contrary. 138 Mrs. Jathoul alleged that
the consular officer and the State Department violated her due process rights
by failing to provide her with their reasons for denying her husband’s visa
and, thereby, burdened her constitutionally protected interest in her
marriage. 139 The court rejected Bustamante, which recognized that a foreign
spouse’s visa denial implicated a U.S. citizen’s liberty interests in marriage,
because it believed Bustamante conflicted with D.C. Circuit precedent. 140

b. Standard of review under Mandel’s second inquiry
When a court finds that a visa denial implicates a U.S. citizen’s rights,141
thus triggering Mandel review, courts then determine if the visa denial was
based on a facially legitimate and bona fide reason. 142 The Mandel decision
did not identify what constitutes a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for
denying a visa, and prior and subsequent cases provide minimal guidance on
what the standard means. 143 In a number of cases finding the First
Amendment rights of U.S. citizens implicated, some courts have stated that a

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 172 (following the D.C. Circuit’s decision and reasoning from Swartz v.

Rogers, where the court did not find a violation of a liberty interest in marriage when the
petitioner’s husband was deported, and arguing that the court in Bustamante accepted the
plaintiff’s claims “at face value and did not consider whether the visa denial actually implicated
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
141. Recognizing that courts are split about when Mandel review applies, the use of
“rights” in this sentence assumes that a court has recognized that either a First Amendment
claim or Fifth Amendment due process claim is present and proceeds to the next step of
Mandel review.
142. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (finding that the
government had offered a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for denying Mr. Mandel’s
visa waiver and stating that this was all the review necessary); Burrafato v. U.S. Dep’t of State,
523 F.2d 554, 556 (2d Cir. 1975) (interpreting Mandel’s second inquiry to “require
justification for an aliens exclusion”).
143. Compare Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1116 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that the
government cannot exclude a noncitizen with a “bare assertion” that the noncitizen’s presence
contravenes U.S. foreign policy interests), with Marczak v. Greene, 971 F.2d 510, 517 (10th
Cir. 1992) (finding that the facially legitimate standard is “used relatively infrequently, [so] its
meaning is elusive,” and that therefore a consular officer’s decision must be reasonably
supported by the record). See generally Nafziger, supra note 16, at 75–76 (stating that
Mandel’s standard of review is ambiguous); Wurtzel, supra note 82, at 163 (suggesting that
Mandel’s unclear and “elastic” standard of review results in “divergent” interpretations).
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consular officer can offer “almost any reason, even if it is conclusory,” or can
offer a reason that is “supported by neither evidence nor argumentation.” 144
For example, in Adams v. Baker, 145 the First Circuit determined that
“facially legitimate and bona fide” reasons include sufficient evidence from
which a consular officer could form a “reasonable ground to believe” that a
noncitizen has engaged in terrorism-related activities. 146 In Baker, the State
Department denied an Irish citizen’s visa because he was the president of an
organization that the government believed engaged in terrorist activities.147
The First Circuit found that the U.S.-citizen plaintiffs raised a valid First
Amendment claim and applied Mandel review. 148 The court ultimately
agreed with the district court and held that the government had sufficient
evidence to link Mr. Adams with terrorist activity such that the visa denial
was based on facially legitimate and bona fide reasons. 149
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Mandel standard is ambiguous.
Like the First Circuit in Baker, the Ninth Circuit in Bustamante determined
that a consular officer “had reason to believe” that the U.S. citizen’s spouse
had engaged in drug trafficking because the consular officer had received
evidence from the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) linking the noncitizen
spouse to drug trafficking. 150 The court found the link to be sufficient to
meet the Mandel standard. 151 In Din, however, the Ninth Circuit found that
a consular officer’s citation to a provision in a statute alone, without
accompanying factual allegations, was not sufficient to meet the facially
legitimate and bona fide standard. 152 Although the Mandel standard is also a
source of disagreement among federal circuits, this Comment will not
examine Mandel’s second inquiry and instead will focus on Mandel’s first
inquiry.

144. See Wurtzel, supra note 82, at 163–64 (denouncing the “facially legitimate and bona
fide” standard as “toothless” because it allows the government to offer almost any reason for a
denial, making it “impossible to differentiate between legitimate and pretextual reasons”).
145. 909 F.2d 643 (1st Cir. 1990).
146. Id. at 649 (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Id. at 645.
148. Id. at 647–50.
149. See id. at 649–50 (noting that a consular officer’s decision regarding a visa applicant’s
relationship with terrorism and the information used to reach that conclusion is “subject only
to a very narrow review”).
150. Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
151. Id.
152. Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 861, 867 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44
(2014).
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C. Supreme Court Cases Protecting the Fundamental Right to Marital
Relationships and the Right to Live with One’s Extended Family
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause protects against arbitrary
government actions that deprive an individual of “life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” 153 When an individual asserts a procedural due
process claim, the individual must demonstrate that the government has
deprived him or her of a liberty or property interest.154 A liberty or property
interest exists if an individual can demonstrate that courts uphold it as a
constitutionally protected interest or if a federal statute grants an individual a
protected interest. 155 The Supreme Court has long afforded protections to
the family and has declared that unreasonable or arbitrary government
actions interfering with an individual’s right to marry and to raise a family, to
choose where to reside, and to live with extended family members merit
close scrutiny. This section provides an overview of the Supreme Court
cases guaranteeing that these rights are fundamental liberty interests and
therefore deserve heightened procedural due process protection.

1. Supreme Court cases protecting the fundamental right to marriage
and to raise a family
Courts have long protected against unwarranted government intrusion in
matters of marriage and family life. In 1923, the Supreme Court in Meyer v.
Nebraska 156 held that the right “to marry [and] establish a home and bring up
children” is a long-recognized privilege “essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.” 157 Since Meyer, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed
the right to marry and experience family life in several cases. 158 For example,
153. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
154. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976) (“It is apparent from our decisions that
there exists a variety of interests which are difficult of definition but are nevertheless
comprehended within the meaning of either ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ as meant in the Due
Process Clause.”).
155. See Udugampola v. Jacobs, 795 F. Supp. 2d 96, 104 (D.D.C.) (“[T]he interests that
are comprehended within the meaning of either liberty or property, as covered by the due
process clause of the Constitution, are those interests which have attain[ed] constitutional
status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially recognized or protected by state law or
federal law.” (alterations in original) (quoting Doe v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092,
1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985))), appeal dismissed, No. 11-5215, 2011 WL 5903822 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
17, 2011).
156. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
157. Id. at 399; see also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (identifying marriage as
the “most important relation in life”).
158. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding that a Texas
statute that criminalized intimate sexual conduct between persons of the same sex violated the
Due Process Clause); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(emphasizing that state regulations cannot invade the intimacies of family life); Cleveland Bd.
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in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 159 the Court considered the
constitutionality of an Oklahoma law that allowed for the sterilization of all
men convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude and
sentenced in an Oklahoma penal institution.160 In finding that “[m]arriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race,” the Court struck down the law on equal protection grounds because
the law did not apply to individuals convicted of similar crimes. 161 Similarly,
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 162 the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a
state law that imposed criminal liability against any person who used or
assisted in the use of contraceptives. 163 The Court found that the state law
In Boddie v.
violated the fundamental right to marital privacy. 164
Connecticut, 165 the Court recognized that “marriage involves interests of basic
importance in our society” and struck down a state law that barred spouses
unable to pay for divorce proceedings from getting a divorce. 166
After the Supreme Court decided Mandel in 1972, the Court continued to
solidify the broad protections available to married couples and families. In
1974, the Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur167
struck down a school board regulation that required teachers to take
maternity leave five months before childbirth. 168 The Court cited decades of
precedent recognizing “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life,” such as choices related to “whether to bear . . . a child.” 169 In

of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (stating that the decision to have a child is a
freedom protected by the Constitution); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971)
(finding that due process prohibits a state from denying couples from getting a divorce solely
because of their inability to pay for one); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(invalidating a state ban on interracial marriages for violating the appellants’ right to marry
under the Due Process Clause).
159. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
160. Id. at 536.
161. See id. at 541 (stating that sterilization violates a basic liberty and declaring that when
two crimes are “intrinsically” similar but the law imposes sterilization on one crime and not
the other, there is an unequal application of the law); see also Loving, 388 U.S. at 12
(“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and
survival.” (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541)).
162. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
163. Id. at 486.
164. See id. (stating that marriage is an intimate association “that promotes a way of
life, . . . a harmony in living, . . . a bilateral loyalty”); see also id. at 493 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (explaining that to determine whether a right is fundamental, the issue is whether
the right can be denied without violating fundamental principals of liberty).
165. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
166. Id. at 376, 383.
167. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
168. Id. at 642.
169. Id. at 639–40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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1978, in Zablocki v. Redhail, 170 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
Wisconsin statute that prohibited granting marriage licenses to individuals
who had failed to pay child support for their noncustodial children. 171 The
Court found the Wisconsin statute unreasonably interfered with the
plaintiff’s desire to marry, stating that “it would make little sense to recognize
a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with
respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the
family in our society.” 172 Then, in 1987, in Turner v. Safley, 173 the Supreme
Court struck down a prison regulation that required the prison
superintendent to determine if there was a “compelling reason” for a
marriage between an inmate and another inmate or a civilian before the
superintendent could approve the marriage. 174 The Court stated that
marriage can be an expression of “emotional support and public
commitment” and that “marriage [can have] spiritual significance” because it
can demonstrate a couple’s religious faith. 175 The Court held that, regardless
of the prison context, inmates have a constitutionally protected interest in
marriage and that the existing permission requirements were not reasonably
related to the expressed penological interests of maintaining prisoner
safety. 176
Similarly, in 1996 in M.L.B. v. S.L.J. 177 and in 2003 in Lawrence v.
Texas, 178 the Supreme Court again emphasized that decisions about
marriage, family life, and raising children are some of the most basic and
important liberty interests in U.S. society that merit protection.179 Recently,
in United States v. Windsor, 180 the Supreme Court struck down the Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA) and highlighted how failing to legally recognize
marriage between same-sex couples burdens financial, emotional, and other
vital personal relations between married couples. 181 Noting that DOMA
prevents the children of same-sex couples from “understand[ing] the integrity
and closeness of their own family,” the Court stated that DOMA confers

170. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
171. Id. at 375, 390–91.
172. Id. at 386.
173. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
174. See id. at 97–98 (striking down the regulation because it was “not reasonably related”
to the security concerns with permitting an inmate to marry).
175. Id. at 95–96.
176. Id. at 96.
177. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
178. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
179. Id. at 573–74; see M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 113, 116 (repeating that choices related to
marriage, familial relationships, and raising children are among the most important).
180. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
181. Id. at 2694–95.
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same-sex couples with a “second-tier marriage” that is “otherwise . . .
unworthy of federal recognition.182 This line of casesfrom 1923 to
presentaffirming the rights to marriage, family relationships, and
procreation demonstrates the Supreme Court’s undeviating protection of
these institutions and activities.

2. Supreme Court cases recognizing the fundamental right to live with
one’s extended family
The Supreme Court has also held that an individual has a fundamental
right to live with his or her immediate or extended family in one household.
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 183 the Court struck down a Cleveland
ordinance that prohibited a grandson from living with his grandmother
because they did not qualify as members of the same “family” under the
ordinance’s definition of the term. 184 The Court reasoned that “when the
government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, this
Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests
advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged
regulation.” 185 The Court relied on the traditional role of the family in U.S.
society to bolster its arguments against the regulation. 186 Justice Powell,
writing for the plurality of the Court, stated that the right to live with one’s
nuclear and extended family is deeply rooted in the value U.S. society has
placed in shared support between family members and in passing down
family values between generations.187 He acknowledged that either “[o]ut of
choice, necessity, or a sense of family responsibility, it has been common for
close relatives to draw together and participate in the duties and the
satisfactions of a common home.” 188 According to the Court, these traditions

182. Id. at 2694.
183. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
184. See id. at 498 (criticizing Cleveland’s ordinance because it “slic[es] deeply into the
family” by arbitrarily “select[ing] certain categories of relatives who may live together”). The
city established the ordinance purportedly to reduce overcrowding, minimize traffic
congestion, and ensure the financial stability of the school system. Id. at 499–500. The Court
dismissed the city’s proffered reasons for the ordinance because the ordinance would do little
to enable them. Id. at 500.
185. Id. at 499. Justice Powell distinguished the Court’s earlier decision in a similar case
by stating that the ordinance in the earlier case did not affect related individuals. Id. at 498.
186. See id. at 503–05 (“Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity
of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition.”); see id. at 507 (Brennan, J,. concurring) (indicating that cities should
not be permitted to manipulate their exercise of the zoning power to intrude into the privacy
of the family).
187. Id. at 503–05 (plurality opinion).
188. Id. at 505.
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and the family’s central role in society merit constitutional protection. 189 In
his concurrence, Justice Brennan underscored the duties of courts and of the
government to protect against any arbitrary intrusions into family interests,
and he included extended families in such interests.190
Even in cases involving adoption, the Supreme Court has recognized a
fundamental right to reside with one’s immediate family members. In Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 191 the Court
considered the validity of New York state procedures that removed foster
children from their foster families. 192 The New York state procedures
entitled foster parents to ten days notice before the state would remove a
child from their custody, as well as an opportunity for an administrative
hearing at their request. 193 In evaluating the state’s actions, the Court
suggested that familiesincluding foster families—have a liberty interest in
remaining together as a family unit and, therefore, are entitled to some
procedural due process before a state can remove foster children from their
care. 194 Ultimately, the Court determined that New York’s procedures were
adequate to support the liberty interests that the plaintiffs asserted. 195

189. Id. at 503–06.
190. Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring).
191. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
192. See id. at 829–32 (detailing the limited procedures foster parents have to contest an
abrupt decision by a state child placement agency to remove the child from the foster family’s
care as a result of a finding by that agency that the child should be transferred to another
foster family or returned to his or her birth parents).
193. Id. at 829.
194. See id. at 843 (reasoning that biological parent-child relationships, which typically do
not exist between foster parents and foster children, are not the sole determinants of the
existence of a family unit and that “[t]he basic foundation of the family in our society, the
marriage relationship, is of course not a matter of blood relation”). The Court cited to the
line of marriage cases recognizing that marriage is a fundamental right that deserves
constitutional protection and then added that
the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the
society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily
association, and from the role it plays in promot[ing] a way of life through the
instruction of children as well as from the fact of blood relationship. No one would
seriously dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an
adult and a child in his or her care may exist even in the absence of blood
relationship.
Id. at 843–44 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
195. Id. at 855–56.
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3. Supreme Court and circuit court cases addressing family matters in
the immigration context
The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the importance of family
reunification and has recognized the fundamental rights involved in marriage
as well as in living with one’s immediate and extended family members.
However, when evaluating family matters in the context of immigration laws,
the Court and some circuit courts have used disparate language. For
example, in Fiallo v. Bell, 196 unwed U.S.-citizen fathers challenged the
constitutionality of a section of the INA preventing them and their
illegitimate children from receiving the special preferences of “parent” and
“child” because it impinged on their fundamental right to a “familial
relationship.” 197 Although the Court found that the INA provision implicated
the U.S.-citizen fathers’ constitutional rights, the Supreme Court ultimately
disagreed with the U.S.-citizen fathers and applied a limited review. 198 The
Court relied on Mandel’s plenary power reasoning to constrain any further
review of the fathers’ claims but accepted that the Court had “limited judicial
responsibility.” 199 Justice Marshall, in his forceful dissent, declared that the
plenary power precedents upon which the majority relied were outdated.200
He argued that cases involving family matters are distinguishable from
Mandel—which did not involve family members—and that these cases
deserve more review. 201

196. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
197. See id. at 794 (explaining that the fathers sought to distinguish prior Supreme Court
immigration opinions from the instant case by arguing that none of the other cases dealt with
sex discrimination and a child’s illegitimacy or otherwise implicated citizens’ and permanent
residents’ fundamental rights respecting the family).
198. See id. at 792–95 (noting that immigration legislation is subject to limited review
because the plenary power doctrine suggests that Congress and the executive branch have
complete control over admission and exclusion decisions).
199 Id. at 793 n.5 (“Our cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under
the Constitution even with respect to the power of Congress to regulate the admission and
exclusion of aliens . . . .”). But see id. at 794–95 (reasoning that no reason existed to apply a
different standard than that from Mandel, where the Court had held that “when the Executive
exercises this [delegated] power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide
reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by
balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal
communication with the applicant” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
200. See id. at 805–06 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the government does not
have unreviewable discretion and that the “old immigration cases” upon which the majority
relied “[were] not the strongest precedents in the United States Reports” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
201. Id. at 808–10. Justice Marshall also distinguished Fiallo from Mandel, arguing that
unlike in Mandel, the interests involved in Fiallo directly affected U.S.-citizen family
members. See id. at 808 (suggesting that Mandel was focused on the government’s interest in
.
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The Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
have also emphasized the fundamental right of a U.S. citizen to choose in
what country to reside. In Schneider v. Rusk, 202 the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a statute that stripped citizenship from a
U.S. citizen who had continuously resided abroad for three years in her
country of birth. 203 The Court struck down the statute as a violation of the
citizen’s due process, reasoning that a U.S. citizen has a fundamental right to
reside wherever he chooses, whether in the United States or abroad.204
Similarly, in Acosta v. Gaffney, 205 the Third Circuit evaluated whether an
infant U.S. citizen was entitled to a stay of her parents’ deportation because
deporting them would deny her the right to reside in the United States.206
The Third Circuit held that the district court erred when it decided that a
stay of deportation would be appropriate. 207 The court reasoned that a
refusal to grant a stay of deportation would not violate the infant’s right to
choose her residence because, as an infant, she could not make a conscious
choice about where to live and must reside with her parents.208 The court,
however, still recognized that “[t]he right of an American citizen to fix and
change his residence is a continuing one which he enjoys throughout his
life.” 209
The Supreme Court has, in subsequent years, continued to uphold
familial ties even when an immigration issue was involved. For example, in
Landon v. Plasencia, 210 the Supreme Court gave considerable weight to a
noncitizen’s familial ties to the United States to grant her more due process
protections. 211 Mrs. Plasencia, a legal permanent resident, left the United
admitting or not admitting noncitizens whereas the purpose of the statutory provision at issue
in Fiallo was to give rights to U.S. citizens).
202. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
203. Id. at 164.
204. Id. at 168–69.
205. 558 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1977).
206. See id. at 1155 (explaining that the infant’s parents, who had added themselves as
plaintiffs with their daughter, argued that a deportation order or denial of stay would destroy
their family relationship and deny the U.S.-citizen child equal protection because her parents
were not U.S. citizens).
207. Id. at 1158.
208. See id. (finding that an infant is incapable of exercising the “right of choice of
residence”). The plaintiffs interpreted the child’s liberty interest as her right to reside in her
country of birth. Id. at 1157. However, the court argued that the cognizable liberty interest
was even broader, stating that “[i]t is the fundamental right of an American citizen to reside
wherever he wishes, whether in the United States or abroad . . . .” Id.
209. Id. at 1158 (reasoning that the plaintiff will be able to assert her right as soon as she
reaches the age of “discretion”).
210. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
211. See id. at 30–32 (noting that past precedent has held that “a resident alien returning
from a brief trip has a right to due process just as would a continuously present resident alien”
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States for a few days and was caught smuggling noncitizens into the United
States.212 The Supreme Court held that Mrs. Plasencia was entitled to
procedural due process protections in an exclusion proceeding as an
admitted, continuously present resident of the United States.213 The Court
recognized that the level of process due would vary depending on the
interests at stake but reasoned that the “right to rejoin her immediate family,
[is] a right that ranks high among the interests of the individual.” 214 Thus, in
Plasencia, the Court recognized that Mrs. Plasencia had a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in rejoining her family.
Relatedly, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that a U.S. citizen has a liberty
interest in remaining in the same country with his or her spouse. In Ching v.
Mayorkas, 215 a U.S.-citizen spouse who filed a visa petition for his noncitizen
spouse argued that he had a protected liberty interest that was implicated by
the denial of his wife’s visa petition. 216 The Ninth Circuit agreed and applied
the Mathews v. Eldridge 217 balancing test to determine whether the couple
had received adequate procedural due process protections.218 The Mathews
balancing test asks courts to consider the individual’s liberty interests, the
cost to the government of additional due process procedures, and the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of the individual’s liberty interests as a result of the
deficient procedures. 219 In evaluating the first prong of the Mathews test, the
court in Ching determined that “[t]he right to marry and to enjoy marriage
are unquestionably liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause.”220
The court also reasoned that the “right to live with and not be separated
from one’s immediate family is a ‘right that ranks high among the interests of
the individual’ and cannot be taken away without procedural due process.”221
Thus, the court in Ching recognized that spousal separation or a foreign
spouse’s imminent exclusion from the United States would impose a

and that “once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go
with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly”).
212. Id. at 23.
213. Id. at 31–33.
214. Id. at 34.
215. 725 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2013).
216. Id. at 1153.
217. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
218. Ching, 725 F.3d at 1157–59.
219. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35.
220. See Ching, 725 F.3d at 1157 (indicating that protected liberty interests include “the
right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children” (quoting Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))).
221. Id. (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982)) (arguing that the first prong
of the Mathews test favors the plaintiffs).
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considerable hardship on the fundamental right to enjoy marriage and the
right to not be separated from close family members. 222
Joining the Second Circuit in Burrafato, 223 the D.C. Circuit and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit have held that the government does
not violate a U.S.-citizen spouse’s constitutional rights when it denies his or
her foreign spouse’s visa because the courts have determined that there is no
constitutionally protected interest implicated by the separation or exclusion
of a noncitizen family member as a result of a visa denial. 224 In Swartz v.
Rogers, 225 the D.C. Circuit held that the deportation of the foreign spouse of
a U.S. citizen did not impinge on that U.S. citizen’s constitutional rights.226
The court stated, “[D]eportation would not in any way destroy the legal
union which the marriage created. The physical conditions of the marriage
may change, but the marriage continues.” 227 In Almario v. Attorney
General, 228 the Sixth Circuit considered the constitutionality of an
immigration statute that imposed a two-year foreign residence requirement
for noncitizens who are in deportation proceedings and marry a U.S.
citizen. 229 The court held that the statute was valid and reasoned that the
U.S. citizen did not have a right to have his or her noncitizen spouse remain
in the United States.230
The decisions from the Second, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits are in conflict
with the Ninth Circuit’s decisions and the long-established Supreme Court
precedent, which provides that the rights to enter and maintain a marital
relationship and the rights to live with, rejoin, and remain with family
members are fundamental liberty interests that require procedural due
process protections.
II. THE DENIAL OF AN IMMEDIATE RELATIVE OR FAMILY-SPONSORED
222. See id. at 1157–59 (remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing because two parts
of the Mathews test weighed in the petitioners’ favor).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 119–124 (discussing the Second Circuit’s denial
of jurisdiction to review a visa denial in Burrafato).
224. See, e.g., Almario v. Attorney Gen., 872 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1989); Swartz v. Rogers,
254 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
225. 254 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
226. Id. at 339.
227. Id.
228. 872 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1989).
229. Id. at 149.
230. Id. at 151; see also Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 496 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing
Almario and again refusing to agree with a plaintiff’s characterization of the fundamental right
implicated by the denial of an immediate relative petition). In Bangura, the Sixth Circuit
found that a denial of an immediate relative visa does not infringe upon the right to marry and
further stated that a U.S. citizen does not have a right to have his or her noncitizen spouse
remain in the country. Id.
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VISA OF A U.S. CITIZEN’S FAMILY MEMBER IMPLICATES THAT U.S.
CITIZEN’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, THEREBY ALLOWING AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Supreme Court has carved out an exception to consular
nonreviewability. This exception allows federal courts to apply a limited
review of a visa denial when the visa denial implicates the First Amendment
rights of a U.S. citizen. Scholars have recognized that Mandel provides a
weak test because the Court offered unclear reasoning and poor guidance for
Since first
how subsequent courts should interpret the decision.231
recognizing this exception in Mandel, federal courts have continued to
expand review—first, by extending the grounds covered by Mandel, and
second, by recognizing that some claims beyond the First Amendment may
trigger judicial review. 232 The Supreme Court has not addressed consular
nonreviewability since its decision in Mandel in 1972, and several federal
courts of appeals are in conflict about which rights trigger Mandel review.233
Subpart A, below, analyzes the First, Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits’
interpretations of Mandel review. Applying the Supreme Court’s precedents
recognizing marriage as a fundamental right, subpart B argues that federal
courts should extend Mandel review to claims by U.S. citizens married to
foreign spouses. Finally, subpart C applies the Supreme Court’s precedents
establishing that families have a right to live together and argues that federal
courts should extend Mandel review to all immediate relative and familysponsored visa denials.

A. The First, Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits Broadly Interpret When
Mandel Review Applies
The Supreme Court in Mandel failed to specify when Mandel review
would apply. 234 As a result, over the past four decades, federal courts have
231. See Nafziger, supra note 16, at 75 (“The intended scope of the Mandel test of a
‘facially legitimate and bona fide reason’ for an immigration decision is anything but clear.”).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 110–117 (discussing cases extending Mandel to
U.S. citizens claiming that denial impinges on their fundamental rights to marriage and
concerning family relations); see also Donald S. Dobkin, Challenging the Doctrine of
Consular Nonreviewability in Immigration Cases, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 113, 130–31 (2010)
(criticizing the Supreme Court’s holding in Mandel for not providing plaintiffs with guidance
about which type of due process violation they must assert to be eligible for Mandel review).
233. See Centeno v. Shultz, 817 F.2d 1212, 1214 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (referring to
Mandel and holding that a Filipino citizen’s nonimmigrant visa was not subject to judicial
review); Burrafato v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 523 F.2d 554, 556–57 (2d Cir. 1975) (refusing to
review a foreign spouse’s visa, citing Mandel).
234. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (“What First Amendment or
other grounds may be available for attacking exercise of discretion for which no justification
whatsoever is advanced is a question we neither address or decide in this case.”). Compare
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interpreted Mandel to fill the Court’s void. 235 Although Mandel involved a
visa waiver denial, federal courts have expanded the application of Mandel
review to include visa denials involving U.S. citizens’ First Amendment and
Fifth Amendment due process rights.236 Following the First, Second, and
D.C. Circuits, which apply a broad interpretation of Mandel’s original
holding, the Ninth Circuit in Bustamante and Din correctly found that
Mandel review extends to a visa denial that implicates a U.S. citizen’s
protected liberty interests in marriage and family life. 237 When the Supreme
Court decides Din, it should follow these four courts of appeals, which allow
a limited judicial of review a U.S.-citizen spouse’s or family member’s denied
visa.
The First, Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have broadly applied
Mandel—first, by extending Mandel review to visa denials (rather than
limiting review only to visa waiver denials as in Mandel), and second, by not
explicitly limiting the scope of Mandel to only U.S. citizens’ First
Amendment claims. 238 In Bruno, the D.C. Circuit broadly interpreted
Mandel as holding that review applies when a U.S. citizen asserts a violation
of his or her constitutional rights as a result of the noncitizen’s visa denial.239
Burrafato, 523 F.2d at 554 (declining to hold that a U.S. citizen’s fundamental rights to
marriage or to live with her spouse triggers Mandel review), with Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531

F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a U.S. citizen’s fundamental rights to marriage
and in family relations are implicated when a consular officer denies her foreign spouse’s visa
and that the decision is entitled to judicial review).
235. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2009)
(expanding Mandel to include visa denials and not only visa waiver denials); Adams v. Baker,
909 F.2d 643, 647–48 (1st Cir. 1990) (choosing to apply Mandel review only in instances of
“clear error” and without a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for such a denial
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1075 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (same), aff’d, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (per curiam).
236. Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014);
Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1061–62; Baker, 909 F.2d at 645; Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111,
1116 (1st Cir. 1988); Burrafato, 523 F.2d at 555; see also Delgado, supra note 53, at 66–67
(stating that the “practical effect of [Bustamante and American Academy is] an abandonment
of the doctrine of consular absolutism”).
237. See Din, 718 F.3d at 860 (“Since Mandel, our Court and several of our sister circuits
have exercised jurisdiction over citizens’ challenges to visa denials that implicate the citizens’
constitutional rights.”); Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1062 (“Joining the First, Second, and D.C.
Circuits, we hold that under Mandel, a U.S. citizen raising a constitutional challenge to the
denial of a visa is entitled to a limited judicial inquiry regarding the reason for the decision.”).
238. See cases cited supra note 237; see also Burt Neuborne & Steven R Shapiro, The
Nylon Curtain: America’s National Border and the Free Flow of Ideas, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 719, 750–52 (1985) (suggesting that some lower courts have interpreted Mandel
liberally).
239. See Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (interpreting
Abourezk to hold that when a U.S.-citizen visa petitioner asserts a violation of his or her
constitutional rights as a result of the Department of State’s visa denial, judicial review is
“proper”).
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The D.C. Circuit did not limit its interpretation of Mandel to U.S. citizens
raising First Amendment claims. 240 Although the court ultimately found that
the U.S.-citizen petitioners lacked standing because they did not assert a
constitutional violation as a result of the noncitizen’s visa denial, 241 its decision
suggests that if the petitioners had asserted a valid violation of a fundamental
right, the D.C. Circuit would have reviewed the noncitizen’s visa denial.
The First and Second Circuits reached similar conclusions in Baker and
Burrafato, respectively. 242 Although Baker involved only First Amendment
rights of U.S. citizens, 243 the court expressly stated that immigration decisions
“based upon constitutional rights and interests of United States citizens” were
at least subject to limited review. 244 In doing so, the court implicitly rejected
the notion that First Amendment claims are the only constitutional claims
that allow for Mandel review. Likewise, the Second Circuit in Burrafato did
not limit Mandel’s holding to only First Amendment claims. Rather, the
court denied review in that case because of Second Circuit precedent that
visa denials do not implicate spousal rights to marriage. 245
In American Academy, the Second Circuit extended Mandel review to
U.S. citizens asserting First Amendment claims over a consular officer’s visa
denial. 246 The Second Circuit, following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Bustamante, rejected the government’s claim that Mandel review applies
only to visa waivers and interpreted Mandel review as applying to a consular

240. See Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS, 564 F.2d 417, 428 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(interpreting Mandel as requiring the government to show a “facially legitimate and bona fide
reason” for a visa refusal when there is a constitutionally protected interest involved).
241. See Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1163–64 (“Unlike Abourezk, Saavedra’s American
sponsors . . . asserted no constitutional claims. Furthermore, in our view, [Saavedra’s
American sponsors do not] have standing to challenge the denial . . . .”).
242. Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643, 650 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that there was in fact a
facially legitimate and bona fide reason for denying the visa application at issue); Burrafato v.
U.S. Dep’t of State, 523 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1975) (concluding the nonresident did not
have standing to bring a claim in federal court).
243. Baker, 909 F.2d at 647.
244. Id. (emphasis added).
245. See Burrafato, 523 F.2d at 555 (explaining that the court precedent “foreclosed” the
decision in the instant case).
246. Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We
conclude that, where a plaintiff, with standing to do so, asserts a First Amendment claim to
have a visa applicant present views in this country, we should apply Mandel to a consular
officer’s denial of a visa.”); see also Margaret Laufman, Comment, American Academy of
Religion v. Napolitano, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1173, 1175 (2011) (arguing that the Second
Circuit’s decision in American Academy “could provide the basis for courts to recognize a
broader exception that would allow judicial review of visa denials that implicate any
constitutional interest of U.S. citizens”).
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officer’s visa denial where a U.S. citizen asserts a constitutional claim.247 The
Second Circuit distinguished Burrafato by stating that the court in that case
did not reach the question of whether Mandel applied to visa denials
because it found that the U.S.-citizen spouse lacked standing to assert her
claim. 248
In Bustamante, the Ninth Circuit became the first court of appeals to
declare that a non-First Amendment claim can trigger Mandel review.
Relying on First, Second, and D.C. Circuit precedent, the court interpreted
Mandel’s holding to apply where a visa denial implicates any U.S. citizen’s
The court correctly relied on
constitutionally protected interests.249
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, a substantive due process case
recognizing the freedom of personal choice in marriage and family life, to
find that a consular officer’s visa denial implicated the U.S. citizen’s liberty
interest in her marriage and, thus, triggered Mandel review. 250 Other federal
courts have critiqued the Bustamante court for accepting the U.S. citizen’s
assertion of her liberty interest at face value. 251 This characterization of
Bustamante is incorrect because the Ninth Circuit correctly relied on
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 252 a Supreme Court procedural
due process decision, and held that “the Due Process Clause provides that
certain substantive rightslife, liberty, and propertycannot be deprived

247. See Am. Acad. of Religion, 573 F.3d at 124 (adding that “[t]he case law in the
aftermath of Mandel favors such review”).
248. See id. at 124–25 (asserting that the Second Circuit has not addressed the question of
whether Mandel review applies to visa denials).
249. Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008).
250. See id. at 1062 (“Freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is,
of course, one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause.” (citing Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–640 (1974))).
251. See, e.g., Jathoul v. Clinton, 880 F. Supp. 2d 168, 172 (D.D.C. 2012) (alleging that
Bustamante does not apply because the Ninth Circuit in that case did not explain why the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights were actually implicated); Udugampola v. Jacobs, 795 F. Supp.
2d 96, 105–06 (D.D.C.) (stating that the physical separation of deportation does not diminish
the constitutional right to marriage), appeal dismissed, No. 11-5215, 2011 WL 5903822 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 17, 2011). Despite these arguments, the court in Bustamante may have implicitly
deemed unwarranted any explanation of why a U.S.-citizen spouse had a liberty interest in her
marriage because it may have determined the existence of that liberty interest incontrovertible.
The issue is not necessarily that the constitutional right is diminished, as the court in
Udugampola argues, but rather that the government action impinges on the U.S. citizen’s
ability to consummate a marriage or reside in the same home as her foreign spouse. The
U.S.-citizen petitioner’s point is not that her right to marriage or to raise a family absolves as a
result of the visa denial but that a visa denial could severely affect the result of the marriage,
and because of that, some procedural protections should exist, even if a court ultimately
determines that all the process due is a facially legitimate and bona fide reason.
252. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.” 253 In Din, decided
five years after Bustamante, the Ninth Circuit appropriately rejected the
government’s argument that Bustamante was not good law because it was in
conflict with D.C. and Second Circuit precedent. 254 The court in Din
accurately asserted that a U.S.-citizen spouse’s right to review is grounded in
a broader right to “[f]reedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life.” 255
Despite refusing to strike down the doctrine of consular nonreviewability,
the Supreme Court in Mandel signaled that a consular officer’s decision was
not absolute by allowing some review of a consular officer’s decision when
the denial implicated the First Amendment rights of the U.S.-citizen
professors involved in the case. 256 The decisions from the First, Second,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits demonstrate how federal courts have correctly
interpreted Mandel to expand access to judicial review overall. By reviewing
a consular officer’s visa denial and not solely a visa waiver denial, these
federal courts have expanded the grounds under which Mandel review
applies. The First, Second, and D.C. Circuits’ readiness to recognize a role
for the judiciary in consular decisions where the constitutional interests of a
U.S. citizen are at stake—beyond First Amendment claims—paved the way for
the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Bustamante and Din.
Together, these cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court should not
limit Mandel to First Amendment claims when other types of fundamental
rights—such as the right to marriage, to raise a family, and the right to live
with one’s extended family members—are equally important. The court in
Bustamante appropriately recognized that there are higher stakes involved
when a consular officer’s decision threatens a U.S. citizen’s marriage.
Moreover, Bustamante demonstrates that the doctrine of consular
nonreviewability does not rigorously bind federal courts as it did in the 1970s
when the Supreme Court initially decided Mandel and Burrafato. The lower
253. See Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1062 (alteration in original) (quoting Loudermill, 470
U.S. at 541). In Loudermill, the Supreme Court determined that public employees who were
terminated had a property interest in their employment and, thus, that they could not be
terminated without the opportunity for a hearing or notice and an opportunity to respond.
See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546. The plaintiffs in Bustamante similarly raised a procedural
due process claim, and the Ninth Circuit determined that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Loudermill—which provides that when a liberty or property interest is at stake, some
procedural protections should exist—also applied in the instant case. Bustamante, 431 F.3d at
106.
254. See Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 860 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013) (dismissing the government’s
articulation of the liberty interest at stake in Bustamante), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014).
255. See id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bustamante, 531 F.3d at 1062) (stressing that
the liberty interest in Bustamante should not be interpreted as “the ability to live in the United
State with an alien spouse”).
256. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
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courts’ perpetual acknowledgment of some judicial responsibility over
consular decisions, combined with decades of Supreme Court precedent
guaranteeing the fundamental rights associated with marriage, raising a
family, and living together as a family demonstrates that U.S. citizens should
have an avenue for formal—even if limited—judicial review of their spouse’s
or immediate family member’s visa denial.

B.

A U.S. Citizen’s Rights Are Implicated by the Denial of His or Her
Spouse’s Visa
In Mandel, the U.S.-citizen professors alleged that Mr. Mandel’s exclusion

violated their First Amendment right of free speech and their Fifth
Amendment due process rights. Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower
court specifically addressed whether their holdings included all
constitutionally protected rights (thereby triggering Fifth Amendment
protections) or whether their holdings merely addressed the plaintiffs’ First
Amendment claims. This ambiguity has contributed to federal courts’
divergent applications of Mandel review. Thus, courts are in conflict about
whether a visa denial impinges on a U.S.-citizen plaintiff’s rights to marry and
to raise a family and thus about whether a U.S. citizen can assert a Fifth
Amendment due process violation claim as a result of the denial.
The Supreme Court should follow the Ninth Circuit and extend Mandel
review to claims by U.S.-citizen spouses because the Supreme Court has long
recognized marriage as a fundamental right and has held that government
intrusions on an individual’s ability to enter into, preserve, or dissolve a
marriage deserve judicial protection and constitutionally adequate
procedures. When a consular officer denies a foreign spouse’s visa, the
consular officer could prevent a U.S.-citizen spouse from consummating his
or her marriage, establishing a home, and raising a unified family. While the
denial of a visa may not prevent a couple from legally “entering” into a
marriage, establishing a home abroad, or raising a child abroad, separation
does make engaging in these activities together more difficult and could in
fact pose a threat to other essential aspects of married and family life that the
Supreme Court has identified as constitutionally protected. Moreover, even
if a foreign family member of a U.S. citizen has been deemed a national
security risk, some information should be revealed either to the foreign
national or the U.S. citizen to understand the allegations against the
individual. 257
257. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545 WHA, 2014 WL
6609111, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014) (stating that government interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests merits some judicial responsibility, but also
recognizing that “[d]ue process . . . is a flexible concept that varies with the particular
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When the Supreme Court decided Mandel, the Court had amply upheld
the liberty interests involved in marriage and family life. In 1923, the
Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska found that the rights to marry, to
establish a home, and to raise a family were constitutionally protected
interests.258 The Court recognized that the government could not infringe on
these liberties in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner even if the purpose
of the government’s action was to protect the public interest. 259 By declining
a foreign spouse’s visa, a consular officer is effectively impeding a U.S.
citizen’s opportunity to establish a home and raise a family in the United
States. If the denial is based on legitimate and judicious reasons, then a U.S.
citizen will have to bear the results of the denial. Unfortunately, a consular
officer could deny a visa based on false information, a mistake, or pretext,
and neither the U.S.-citizen petitioner nor the visa applicant will have a fair
opportunity to contest the allegations or appeal the denial. 260 When a denial
is based on classified information, as in many no-fly list cases, a U.S. citizen,
on behalf of his or her spouse, should be given the opportunity to review that
information—even on a sealed or limited basis—to give the U.S. citizen and
the applicant an opportunity to rebut the allegations against the applicant. 261
There are currently no independent administrative or judicial oversight
provisions in place to ensure that a consular officer does not act arbitrarily or
unreasonably. 262 As one scholar notes, this raw, absolute power raises the
potential for abuse, particularly in the wake of September 11th, when
administrative officials, especially those charged with immigration duties, are
responsible for guarding the country against terrorist threats.263 The Court in

situation” (alterations in original) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990))).
Thus, a court could determine that limited protections are due because a noncitizen spouse
poses a threat to national security.
258. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
259. Id. at 399–400.
260. See Zas, supra note 17, at 587–88 (explaining that the doctrine of consular
nonreviewability applies “even if the consul acts capriciously, arbitrarily, or maliciously”).
261. Cf. Ibrahim, 2014 WL 6609111, at *19–21 (denying challenges to visa denials under
the state secrets privilege but concluding that a consular officer erred in not advising the
noncitizen applicant of her right to apply for a waiver). In Ibrahim, the court stated that when
an executive branch official makes a “reviewable, concrete adverse action” or a
nondiscretionary action, then a court would be able to adjudicate the extent to which it could
provide the plaintiff access—in a sealed or classified manner—to the information that exists
against her. Id. at *21. However, the court determined that a decision on a visa denial is
unreviewable. Id.
262. See Zas, supra note 17, at 588 (disparaging the absolute power granted to consular
officers). See generally Nafziger, supra note 16, at 16–25, 95–102 (analyzing existing visa
review procedures and proposing a new review mechanism).
263. See Zas, supra note 17, at 589 nn.98–99 (highlighting Justice Jackson’s concurrence
in Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1948), which cautioned against
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Meyer specifically cautioned that government actions could not infringe on
the liberties to establish a home and raise a family even under the pretense
of protecting the public interest. 264 Relatedly, the Court in Skinner, in
striking a down a forced sterilization law, reasoned that public safety was not
a compelling reason to limit even the “most elementary notions of due
process.”265 Therefore, absent a countervailing national interest and even
given the heightened responsibilities of consular officials aimed at protecting
national security, consular officers should not have absolute power to dictate
the private lives of U.S. citizens with strong ties to foreign nationals. 266
The D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Swartz, the Second Circuit’s decision in
Burrafato, and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Almario misconstrue the rights
implicated by the removal or exclusion of a foreign spouse. These circuits
interpret the U.S. citizen’s right as the right to have his or her spouse reside
or remain in the United States or as the right to live in the United States with
a foreign spouse. 267 These interpretations are incorrect. In deciding Din, the
Supreme Court should not interpret the right at stake as the U.S. citizen’s
right to have his or her spouse live in the United States as the Sixth Circuit
did in Almario, nor should it brazenly disregard the constitutionally
protected interests implicated by a family member’s exclusion or removal
from the United States, as the Second Circuit did in Burrafato. 268 Rather, the
Supreme Court should interpret the right at stake as the U.S. citizen’s right
to marry an individual of his or her choice, to preserve his or her marriage,
and to raise a family. The Supreme Court should instead affirm the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Din, which noted that the U.S. citizen’s right is
“decisions made in the heat of a war atmosphere because patriotic fervor makes moderation
unpopular”).
264. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399–400 (stating that courts have the responsibility and
authority to evaluate a legislature’s determination of the scope of the police power).
265. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 545 (1942) (Stone, J., concurring)
(conceding that the government may need to occasionally act to protect the public interest but
should still protect an individual’s liberty interests as well).
266. See Zas, supra note 17, at 589 (intimating that low ranking consular officials may be
“negatively influence[d]” by national security prerogatives and may have “more incentives to
deny, rather than issue a visa”).
267. See Almario v. Att’y Gen., 872 F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that a U.S.
citizen does not have a right to have her alien spouse reside in the U.S.); Burrafato v. U.S.
Dep’t of State, 523 F.2d 554, 555 (2d Cir. 1975) (affirming the rule in the circuit that citizens
do not have a constitutional right that is infringed when his or her alien spouse is deported);
Swartz v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 338, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (same).
268. See Almario, 872 F.2d at 151 (citing Burrafato, 523 F.2d at 555) (declaring that a
U.S. citizen lacks a right to have a foreign spouse remain in the United States); Burrafato 523
F.2d at 555–57 (citing Swartz, 254 F.2d 338) (stating that a U.S. citizen’s constitutional rights
are not violated by the removal of her spouse). These cases offer weak precedents. Almario,
more recently decided, relies on Burrafato, which relies on Swartz, a case decided fourteen
years before Mandel.
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predicated on a more general right to “[f]reedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life.” 269 This reasoning parallels the Supreme
Court’s decision in Griswold, which acknowledged that private marital
decisions are entitled to constitutional protection.270 In Swartz, the decision
on which Almario and Burrafato rely, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that
removal of a foreign spouse from the United States would not in any way
interfere with the couple’s ability to enter into or remain in a legal union.271
While that may be true, the Supreme Court in Griswold interpreted the
fundamental right to marriage more broadly: the Court held that there is a
fundamental right to decisions made while married and not merely a
fundamental right to entering into a marriage. 272 Thus, the Supreme Court
has determined that government actions infringing on decisions made while
married or that affect elements of married and family life are constitutionally
protected. Those decisions may become more unstable when the
government action—perhaps without a proffered reason—separates a couple
across borders.
After Mandel, the Supreme Court continued to afford even greater
protections to an individual’s decisions involving marriage and family
matters. In 1974, the Court in LaFleur affirmed decades of Supreme Court
precedent and recognized a liberty interest in matters related to marriage and
family life, such as the decision to bear a child. 273 Likewise, in 1978, the
Supreme Court in Zablocki broadly interpreted the right to marry. 274 The
Court equated the right to marry with bearing and raising children and
269. See Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 860 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original)
(quoting Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008)) (rebutting the
government’s argument that Bustamante provides an alien spouse with a right to live in the
U.S.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014); see also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not
from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful respect for the teachings of history [and]
solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.” (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
270. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(“Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from the sanctity of property
rights. The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that
life is something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection the principles
of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right. . . . Of this whole private realm of
family life it is difficult to imagine what is more private or more intimate than a husband and
wife’s marital relations.” (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551–52 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting))).
271. Swartz, 254 F.3d at 339.
272. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86.
273. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974).
274. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978) (striking down a state statute that
required noncustodial parents to pay past due child support payments before the noncustodial
parents could obtain a marriage license).
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maintaining family relationships and held that governmental decisions that
unreasonably interfere with these rights deserve scrutiny because these
relationships are the foundation of U.S. society.275 More recently, in 2013 in
Windsor, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there are “mundane [and]
profound” elements of married and family life that should not be
burdened. 276 The Court further suggested that “diminishing the stability and
predictability of basic personal relations [such as marriage]” erodes the
significance of those institutions. 277 These decisions demonstrate that the
Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the fundamental right to marriage
and family life to encompass those choices made within the marriage, those
involved with entering or dissolving a marriage, and those involved with
bearing and raising children.
A consular officer’s decision would undoubtedly impinge on the foregoing
choices. Beyond preventing a U.S. citizen from residing in the United States
with her foreign spouse, an unfounded, erroneous, or pretextual visa denial
would compromise a U.S. citizen’s decisions about bearing and raising
children as well as other intimate familial and marital decisions. While these
decisions can still be made across borders, the separation of two individuals
who are unable to make both mundane and profound decisions in person
makes the discussions, decisions, and the process of raising a family far more
difficult. The preceding cases highlight the constitutional protections
afforded to couples and the family, and these protections should not yield to
the plenary power doctrine merely because immigration law governs the
foreign spouse’s ability to reside within the United States.278 As Justice
Marshall and Justice Brennan forcefully articulated in their dissent in
Mandel, the line of cases supporting the plenary power doctrine did not
implicate U.S. citizens’ rights. 279 Those decisions, dealing exclusively with the
275. Id. at 386; see also LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 639 (rejecting a school board’s policy
requiring pregnant teachers to take maternity leave during the final months of pregnancy
because it overly burdened the teachers’ freedom of choice in marriage and family decisions).
276. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–95 (2013) (listing some benefits
of married life such as those available for healthcare purposes and responsibilities such as
supporting each other during educational endeavors).
277. See id. at 2694 (stating that DOMA produces an unpredictable “differentiation” for
same-sex married couples—where their marriage is recognized by a state, but not by the
federal government—that derogates the choices the Constitution is designed to protect).
278. See Cox, supra note 59, at 391–92 (“Immigration law regularly injures citizens by
expelling or excluding people with whom citizens associate. . . . [A]ssociational interests
represent one well-established interest of American citizens that immigration policy can affect
in legally cognizable ways.”).
279. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 782 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the plenary power precedents upon which the Mandel majority relied were
distinguishable from Mandel because none of those cases involved the rights of U.S. citizens).
Justice Marshall further emphasized that where “the rights of Americans are involved, there is
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rights of noncitizens, now encourage absolute discretion by consular officers
and prevent federal courts from engaging in review when a visa denial clearly
implicates the rights of a U.S. citizen. This approach is contradictory to
longstanding Supreme Court precedent and the Supreme Court should no
longer follow such precedent.

C.

A U.S. Citizen’s Rights Are Implicated by the Denial of His or Her
Immediate or Extended Family Member’s Visa

For decades the Supreme Court has supported the fundamental right of
family members to live with each other, much like it has protected
individuals’ fundamental right to marriage. In 2013, the Ninth Circuit, citing
to Landon v. Plasencia, correctly stated that the “right to live with and not be
separated from one’s immediate family is ‘a right that ranks high among the
interests of the individual’ and that cannot be taken away without procedural
due process.”280 The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of this right accurately
applies the Supreme Court’s decisions in Moore v. City of East Cleveland
and Landon v. Plasencia, which recognize that a U.S. citizen has a
fundamental right to live with extended family members and which implicitly
recognize that separation from or the inability to rejoin family members
infringes on such right.281 When the Supreme Court considers whether a
U.S. citizen’s rights are implicated by the denial of his or her family
member’s visa, it should follow its reasoning in Moore and Plasencia as well
as the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Ching. The D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Swartz and the Second Circuit’s decision in Burrafato are not reliable
precedents: the D.C. Circuit decided Swartz before the Supreme Court
decided Mandel, and the Second Circuit decided Burrafato before the
Supreme Court had developed its jurisprudence declaring that marriage,
decisions made while married, and decisions to raise a family are
constitutionally protected interests. For the reasons that follow, the Supreme
Court should acknowledge that a U.S. citizen has a constitutionally protected
interest in living, reuniting with, and not being separated from foreign family
members.
no basis for concluding that the power to exclude . . . is absolute.” Id. at 282–83 (adding that
the courts should not “blindly defer” to the legislative and executive branches when personal
liberty is at issue”).
280. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982); see also supra text accompanying notes
215–222 (discussing Ching, where the court, applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test,
reasoned that the U.S.-citizen spouse had a substantial interest at stake in remaining with his
foreign-citizen wife).
281. Compare Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34 (citing Moore and finding that Mrs. Plasencia had
a right to rejoin her immediate family), with Ching v. Mayorkas, 725 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir.
2013) (discussing Plasencia and identifying this right as “the right to live with and not be
separated from one’s immediate family” (emphasis added)).
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First, courts have consistently found that separation from family members
can result in a legally cognizable injury. In Fiallo, the Supreme Court
recognized that the INA’s classification of “parent” and “child” that
prevented U.S.-citizen fathers from claiming their illegitimate children as a
“child” for purposes of a visa petition impinged on the U.S. citizen’s rights.282
Although the Court ultimately applied a limited rational basis review to
uphold the INA’s classification, the Court nonetheless recognized that the
U.S. citizen’s rights were implicated such that they had standing to seek some
review. 283 This is precisely what the Court did in Mandel: the Court
recognized that the noncitizen visa beneficiary lacked standing but that
because U.S. citizens’ rights were implicated, the U.S.-citizen petitioners
could, in fact, seek some review over the noncitizen’s visa waiver denial. 284 A
citizen’s constitutionally protected interest in remaining with a family
member, therefore, should not be insulated from constitutional scrutiny
merely because the immigration action targets the noncitizen. 285
Second, as noted in the preceding section, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Swartz is not reliable precedent. The court in Swartz argued that deportation
did not affect a U.S.-citizen wife’s constitutional rights because spousal
separation did not destroy the legal basis of a marriage but only affected the
physical conditions of the marriage. 286 This reasoning is contradictory to the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Moore and Mandel. In Moore, the Supreme
Court recognized that government interference with the physical conditions
of family relations, such as restrictions on living arrangements, impinges on
an individual’s fundamental rights.287 In these instances, the Court in Moore
argued that “the usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate.” 288
Analogously, in Mandel, the government stressed to the Court that the U.S.
citizens’ First Amendment rights were not implicated because the professors
would still have access to Mr. Mandel’s views in other media forms. 289 The
government urged the Court to disregard the physical separation that would

282. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 788–90, 794–95 (1977) (granting standing to U.S.citizen fathers).
283. See id. at 795 (referring to Mandel, the Court held that there was a limited role for
judicial scrutiny in congressional and executive decisions related to immigration law).
284. See Cox, supra note 59, at 412–16 (describing the cases in which citizens have
asserted constitutional challenges against immigration laws).
285. Id. at 390–91, 412 (finding that courts have regularly recognized that immigration
laws can interfere with a U.S. citizen’s legally cognizable rights and stressing that immigration
decisions should not be sequestered from constitutional adherence).
286. See Swartz v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 338, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (rationalizing that the
marriage itself would continue even though the noncitizen spouse would not live in the U.S.).
287. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499–501 (1977) (plurality opinion).
288. Id. at 499.
289. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
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result from the professor’s visa waiver denial. 290 The Court flatly rejected the
government’s argument, finding that there are “particular qualities inherent
in sustained, face-to-face-debate, discussion and questioning.” 291 Thus, the
Court in Mandel recognized that the physical separation of the U.S.-citizen
petitioners and the foreign visa applicant burdened the U.S. citizens’
constitutionally protected interests.
A consular officer’s visa denial would instantly prevent a U.S. citizen and a
foreign family member from living together. Although this may be
temporary, the result may be permanent if the visa is ultimately never
approved, such as when a consular officer finds that there is an alleged
terrorism-related ground of inadmissibility that applies. The U.S. citizen is
then either forced to leave the United States to live with her foreign family
members abroad or to live without them in the United States, a result that
could lead to economic and emotional hardship for the U.S. citizen. As
mentioned in the previous section, if the visa denial is a result of a judicious
and reasonable government action, then the U.S. citizen will have to bear the
consequences. If, however, the visa denial is based on frivolous or
erroneous facts, then the current system does not allow for any form of
independent review, and the U.S. citizen may be arbitrarily deprived of a
long protected liberty interest. The Supreme Court in Moore and Mandel,
in contrast to the D.C. Circuit in Swartz, recognized that physical separation
burdens a U.S. citizen’s constitutionally protected interest, even if the legal
relationship between the parties remained unchanged.
Third, substantive and procedural due process protections have greatly
expanded since the D.C. Circuit decided Swartz in 1958 and the Second
Circuit decided Burrafato in 1975. Notably, the Supreme Court decided
Moore and subsequent cases recognizing that family members have a
fundamental right to live with each other nearly two decades after Swartz.292
Even more important, at the time of Swartz, the Court had not decided
Mandel, but federal courts have continued to cite Swartz as if it were binding
authority on review of visa denials. Additionally, the Second Circuit decided
Burrafato, another case courts rely on to decline foreign spouses and family

290. Id.
291. See id. (adding that the Court was unwilling to hold that the existence of alternative
means of access to Mandel’s teachings was sufficient to overcome the U.S. citizens’ First
Amendment rights to hear him speak in person).
292. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that courts must
carefully evaluate the importance of a governmental interest when the government’s action
intrudes on familial living decisions).
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members review of a visa denials, only three years after Mandel. 293 At that
time, few courts had applied Mandel.
CONCLUSION
By denying a U.S. citizen’s spouse’s or family member’s visa, a single
consular officer can force a U.S. citizen to live without this family member or
force the U.S. citizen to abdicate his or her life in the United States to live
with this family member abroad. As a result of the doctrine of consular
nonreviewability, a U.S. citizen does not have an avenue to seek independent
review of this denial. In Mandel, the Supreme Court carved out an
exception to consular nonreviewability when it granted U.S. citizens standing
to assert a constitutional claim against an immigration official’s action. By
identifying this exception, the Court implicitly asserted that a consular
officer’s decision is not wholly immune from a constitutional challenge.
Although the Court provided little guidance about the breadth of its
decision, over the past four decades, federal courts have interpreted and
altered the Mandel test to fill the Court’s void.
The Ninth Circuit in Bustamante and Din provides sound guidance for
federal courts reviewing a visa denial of a U.S. citizen’s family member.
Implicitly acknowledging the increasing interconnectedness of people across
borders and the burdens familial separation places on a U.S. citizen while
explicitly identifying a U.S. citizen’s fundamental right to personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life, the Ninth Circuit correctly determined
that the denial of a foreign spouse’s visa merits more review. The Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning in Bustamante and Din is buttressed by decades of
Supreme Court precedent protecting married couples and families. The
First, Second, and D.C. Circuits’ decisions finding that Mandel review
applies when a visa denial implicates a U.S. citizen’s constitutional rights also
support a broader interpretation of Mandel.
When a visa denial implicates a U.S. citizen’s fundamental right to
marriage or family life, as in the case of immediate relative and familysponsored immigrant visas, a limited judicial review of visa denials should
apply. Extending judicial review to all visa applicants is inefficient and
contrary to long-established precedent limiting the protections afforded to
noncitizens seeking admission into the United States. Review of immediate
relative and family-sponsored immigrant visas, moreover, does not mean that
a visa applicant is entitled to enter the United States or that a U.S. citizen has
a right to have his or her spouse enter the United States. Review of these
visas merely allows a U.S.-citizen petitioner to receive the due process
293. See Laufman, supra note 247, at 1187 n.120 (adding that substantive due process was
a new concept when the Second Circuit decided Burrafato).
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protections that the Supreme Court has recognized exist when a government
action infringes on the fundamental rights of a U.S. citizen. Longstanding
Supreme Court decisions have affirmed the traditional role the family plays
in U.S. society, and these decisions have protected against unwarranted
government actions that burden individual decisions involving marriage and
family matters. The Supreme Court should follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead
and permit Mandel review for immediate relative and family-sponsored visa
denials. In these visa denials, a U.S. citizen has substantial interests at stake,
and courts should grant that U.S. citizen as much or more review than U.S.citizen professors who wish to invite a foreign speaker to a conference in the
United States.

